By Li Xiaobo
The US military has been advancing plans to reactivate several WWII–era airfields across the Pacific. By 2027, the US Air Force is expected to operate three major aviation hubs in the region. These hubs are intended to serve as transit stations for US forces entering the Western Pacific and will possess full-time warfighting capabilities. The key question is: what strategic considerations are driving this move?
It is reported that US military engineers are restoring a number of WWII–era airstrips on remote Pacific islands, upgrading associated facilities to accommodate the takeoff and landing requirements of large transport aircraft, fifth-generation fighters, and wingman drones. Analysts suggest that the reconstruction of these airfields aligns with the US Air Force's concept of Agile Combat Employment (ACE). Chinese Military observer Du Wenlong noted that reactivating multiple WW II–era air bases aims to enhance the US military's rapid strike and dispersed deployment capabilities within the so-called Second Island Chain.
According to Du, previous military deployments of the US in the Asia-Pacific primarily followed a forward-heavy concentration model. Now, the US believes that densely stationing heavy weaponry at a single base makes it highly vulnerable to enemy strikes, which highlights the growing importance of the ACE concept. The US decision to reactivate WWII–era facilities in the Pacific is intended to provide additional operational points for attacks within the Second Island Chain.
In addition to reconstructing three large air hubs, the US military plans to link dozens of auxiliary airfields to these hubs, supporting its renewed "island-hopping" warfighting capabilities in the Pacific region. In addition, multiple air force bases and airfields in the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Philippines are also slated for expansion and upgrading. Meanwhile, the US military is working to modernize a series of airfields along northern corridor routes in Alaska, enabling them to function as bases capable of supporting ACE.
"Island-hopping" operations were a US operational approach employed against Japan during WWII. Their core logic lay in skipping lightly defended positions, much like a dragonfly skimming the water's surface, to strike directly at targets in depth. This was an asymmetric mode of warfare conducted under conditions of overwhelming advantage. However, as adversaries' operational environments and military technologies have evolved, the elements of inter-island confrontation have expanded significantly. They now extend well beyond traditional forces such as large-caliber artillery and short-range tactical aviation to encompass more advanced systems, including medium-range missiles, aircraft carriers, and bombers. Du said that to a large extent, the US move is primarily a political deterrent aimed at showcasing its absolute superiority to its adversaries. In actual combat, however, implementing rapid strikes through the so-called "island-hopping" model is extremely challenging. The logistical chains upon which this strategy relies are vulnerable to disruption by adversaries' hypersonic weapons and other long-range precision strike capabilities.
Du believes that the US military is essentially attempting to leverage agile deployment and its ally network to continually enhance its leverage in the great power competition. However, the practical results of this approach may fall short of its intended goals. Since the release of the 2025 US National Security Strategy, leveraging its ally network to contain major strategic rivals has likely become a core method in major-country competition. In several key regions globally, the US has been expanding military facilities through proxies to serve its broader global strategic needs.
US President Donald Trump has proposed increasing the US defense budget for fiscal year 2027 from $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion to build his so-called dream military. Combining with a series of recent moves in the military domain, Du noted that the proposed military spending target for fiscal year 2027, both in total and in terms of increase, would set a new historical high for the US. Expanding military bases and enhancing Cold War–style confrontation capabilities have become new instruments for the US to conduct global military interventions. Against this backdrop, the claims in the 2025 US National Security Strategy about no longer seeking to dominate the world and about shifting the strategic focus back to the homeland and nearby hotspot regions are, in essence, little more than pretexts designed to divert the attention of the international community.