By Cui Hongjian

NATO recently made a high-profile announcement that all its members will meet the target of allocating 2% of GDP to defense spending within this year, a move that looks more like a political gesture to the US. At the NATO summit in The Hague this June, NATO already set a new target of raising defense spending to 5% of GDP for its members. In this light, meeting the outdated 2% goal was only a matter of time and hardly worth fussing over. However, as an opportunity to demonstrate loyalty and capability to the US, NATO is bound to make a big deal of the "2% benchmark," even rushing to present a flattering report card well before year's end, one that is, at best, of questionable substance.

NATO's rush to claim success appears linked to its reading of Washington's strategic adjustments. Under the Biden administration, the US has emphasized the role of its alliance system. Its approach balances focus on China and Russia, and treats Europe and Asia as an integrated strategic space. Rather than forcing a binary choice between the two regions, Washington seeks to leverage NATO in Europe to contain Russia while extending its influence in the Asia-Pacific. As a result, the US and NATO deliberately promote the narrative that European and Asian security are indivisible and that what happens in Ukraine today could happen in Taiwan tomorrow. NATO has also begun actively advancing its Asian Pacific expansion. During the Trump administration, the Asia-Pacific was treated as a strategic priority over Europe. NATO was not expected to play an active role in the region. Instead, it was tasked with keeping an eye on Russia in Europe and reducing US strategic burdens, freeing Washington to focus on the so-called challenges posed by China. The US stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, its insistence on easing US-Russia relations, and its support for NATO's push to increase defense spending under the guise of enhancing self-defense capabilities all follow Washington's logic of strategic adjustment.

To serve this adjustment, NATO must return to its core role of focusing on transatlantic security, particularly European security. To contribute without complicating matters, at least during Trump's presidency, NATO has to temporarily rein in its ambitions for the Asia Pacific and even global expansion. Instead, it should encourage European countries to devote more resources and shoulder greater responsibilities, a process of "Europeanization" that better aligns with Washington's expectations for NATO's role. However, given the current European security situation, NATO's fundamental structure, and Europe's actual capabilities and self-interest calculations, Washington's plans may not necessarily come to fruition.

First, as long as the Ukraine crisis continues to drag on, no matter how eager the US is to withdraw and rely on Europe to clean up the mess, it will be difficult to swiftly reallocate strategic resources. Currently, Europe not only fails to cooperate within the US-led political process to resolve the crisis but often acts on its own. It repeatedly demands that the US address the crisis within a transatlantic security framework rather than a US-Russia framework. In essence, Europe is using persistent pressure to ensure that European security remains a strategic priority for Washington.

Second, given NATO's fundamental structure, Washington's shift in strategic focus is bound to be a gradual process of constant adjustment between the US and Europe. The US may want to offload burdens in Europe, but it is by no means willing to abandon the continent. Pushing too hard could corner Europe. If Europe were to turn away from the US and pursue genuine strategic autonomy, it would clearly be a major strategic failure for Washington.

Third, whether it is the EU's ReArm Europe Plan or NATO's increase in defense spending, neither is likely to translate in the short term into Europe's actual capability to handle the Ukraine crisis or keep Russia in check. Even with European NATO members meeting their defense spending targets, the US still leads by a wide margin, accounting for nearly 70% of the total. Moreover, Europe is well aware that higher defense spending does not automatically equate to stronger military capability. There is still a long way to go before Europe can act independently.

Overall, the US strategic shift, marked by a change in NATO's role, is likely to result in a scenario where the resources Washington can extract from Europe are insufficient to support a full-scale competition in the Asia-Pacific, ultimately ending in a lose-lose outcome.

(The author is a professor of the Academy of Regional and Global Governance, BFSU)

Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.