By Xiang Haoyu

Since Sanae Takaichi was elected president of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party and is widely expected to become the next prime minister, her foreign policy has drawn close attention. From the perspective of Japanese public opinion, while concerns remain over how a Takaichi Cabinet will handle relations with neighboring countries such as China and the ROK, the more pressing diplomatic challenge lies in how Japan will deal with the so-called Trump risk. Takaichi's right-wing stance, rooted in historical revisionism, Japan's unstable domestic political situation, and potential trade frictions between Japan and the US, may pose structural challenges to Japan–US relations on three fronts, namely strategic trust, policy coordination, and regional stability.

First, historical revisionism could erode the foundation of strategic trust between Japan and the US. The cornerstone of the Japan–US alliance lies not only in shared security interests but also in the joint commitment to uphold the international order after WWII. Takaichi's stance of historical revisionism is most prominently reflected in her visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and her advocacy of portraying Japan's past acts of external aggression as acts of "self–defense." Fundamentally, this runs counter to the US perspective on WWII and the postwar transformation of Japan. In 2013, during his tenure as Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which not only provoked strong protests from China and the ROK but also drew open criticism from the US, delivering a significant warning to Japan. If Takaichi, as Prime Minister, continues such revisionist acts and rhetoric, it would not only constitute an open provocation to Asian countries that once suffered Japanese aggression but also place the US in an awkward position. More importantly, if Takaichi adopts a hardline stance on historical issues and territorial disputes, it could drive Japan–ROK relations back into tension, directly undermining the trilateral Japan–US–ROK alliance that the US has painstakingly built, thereby affecting the strategic posture of the US in East Asia.

Second, there may be policy coordination difficulties between Japan First and America First. In the economic and trade realm, Takaichi's economic nationalism inherently conflicts with Trump's America First doctrine. The Shigeru Ishiba administration, after eight rounds of arduous negotiations, had just reached a tariff framework agreement with the US: Japan would open sensitive sectors such as automobiles and agricultural products to the US market and commit up to US$550 billion in investment in exchange for Washington levying a standard 15% tariff on Japanese imports. Takaichi holds a critical stance toward this unequal agreement, indicating that she is open to renegotiation if the deal fails to serve Japan's interests. Pragmatically, however, fulfilling such a commitment after taking office will not be easy, and if Japan's market opening and investment commitments fall short of expectations, Washington may reimpose maximum pressure on Tokyo.

In the security domain, Takaichi's activism may likewise become a double-edged sword. She advocates amending Article 9 of the pacifist constitution to elevate the Self-Defense Forces into a national defense force, significantly increasing the defense budget, and even proposing discussions on the deployment and use of US nuclear weapons in Japan under emergency circumstances. On the surface, these positions cater to US expectations that its allies take on greater defense responsibilities. However, what the US envisions for Japan's path toward becoming a normal state is a controlled and orderly enhancement of its military capabilities under the framework of the Japan-US alliance. Such a process would serve the broader goal of sustaining America's global hegemony. Takaichi's roadmap, by contrast, carries a stronger tendency to break free from the postwar system and pursue the status of an independent military power. Her discussion of "nuclear sharing" in particular touches upon one of East Asia's most sensitive nerves, potentially sparking a regional arms race and disrupting US efforts in nuclear non-proliferation and strategic deployment.

Finally, Japan and the US may face misalignment in their regional strategic objectives. Takaichi is regarded as pursuing a hardline stance toward China. She has previously identified China as a major threat and shown provocative tendencies on issues such as history, Taiwan, and territorial disputes. It contrasts with the Trump administration's China policy, which seeks to advance strategic competition while managing differences and avoiding conflict. Washington does not want to see its ally's excessive actions hijack the US's China policy, especially on the highly sensitive Taiwan question. If Takaichi adopts adventurist actions on these issues, it could trigger regional conflicts, which would seriously contradict the Trump administration's regional strategic goal of pursuing peace through strength.

For Japan, pursuing a hardline nationalism and historical revisionism under Takaichi could not only intensify tensions with China and the ROK but also lead to Japan's isolation on the international stage.

(The author is a distinguished research fellow at the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies.)

Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.