By Li Ruoyu

Amid strong domestic and international criticism of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's erroneous remarks on Taiwan, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan initiated discussions on considering an early revision of the three key national security documents, including the National Security Strategy, on November 20, which focuses on reassessing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, further increasing defense spending, and easing restrictions on defense equipment exports. If these revisions were to be approved, it would signify a major restructuring of Japan's post-WWII defense strategy.

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles were proposed by former Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, that is, non-possession, non-production and non-introduction of nuclear weapons, in 1967. Eisaku Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for proposing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

The three components of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles can be divided into two parts. The first part, "non-possession and non-production of nuclear weapons," is related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which Japan is a state party, so modifying the first part of the principles would be a legally difficult task. Therefore, the revision pushed by Sanae Takaichi primarily targets the component on "non-introduction of nuclear weapons."

Under the Japan-US security framework, the only potential source for Japan to introduce nuclear weapons would be from the US nuclear deployment in East Asia. Sanae Takaichi claims that the principle of "non-introduction of nuclear weapons" would undermine the effectiveness of US nuclear deterrence. In doing so, she seeks to justify revising this clause under the pretext of strengthening Japan–US relations. However, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles constitute an integrated whole. If Sanae Takaichi were to use the clause of "non-introduction of nuclear weapons" as a leverage point to pry open the entire framework, turning what was once a rigid and immutable principle into a policy that can be modified at will, then the other two principles, namely "non-possession and non-production of nuclear weapons," would inevitably be loosened as well.

Revising the Three Non-Nuclear Principles is fully consistent with the political orientation of the Takaichi administration, which caters to Japan's domestic right-wing populism. In the eyes of Japan's far-right forces, the pacifist Constitution of Japan, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and even Japan's entire postwar national framework are all shackles that constrain the country.

By insisting on amending the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in order to align with US strategic objectives for nuclear deterrence in East Asia, the Takaichi administration would place Japan even more firmly under American control and push the country into a deeper state of strategic passivity. If the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were to be revised, it would undoubtedly provoke global skepticism regarding Japan's international image: Was Japan's former image as a "peaceful nation" a result of a profound reflection on its history of aggressive war, or was it merely a façade deliberately constructed by right-wing forces to conceal their ambitions?

(The author is an associate research fellow at the Department of World History, College of History and Culture, Sichuan University, and a council member of the Chinese Society of Sino-Japanese Relations History.)

Editor's note: Originally published on china.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.