By Xiang Haoyu
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently made extreme and erroneous remarks regarding Taiwan, which were met with strong countermeasures from China. In the face of widespread concern and severe criticism from all sides, the Japanese government has not reflected or corrected its actions, but instead has doubled down on its mistakes. Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi even claimed that missiles would be deployed on Yonaguni Island, about 110 kilometers east of the Taiwan Island.
In response, multiple international voices have pointed out that Japan continues to breach the constraints imposed by its pacifist constitution, pushing for the export of lethal weapons, attempting to revise the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, accelerating military deployment in the southwestern islands, and relaxing its military restrictions. These actions suggest a resurgence of militarism. These extreme and dangerous actions, which challenge the post-war international order and jeopardize peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, have raised serious concerns among countries in the region.
In recent years, as Japan's domestic politics have shifted further to the right, its military and security strategy has undergone the most radical adjustment since WWII. Marked by the introduction of the three national security documents at the end of 2022, Japan has systematically pushed its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) towards a more offensive posture across multiple dimensions, including legal frameworks, institutional changes, budget allocation, equipment modernization, and international cooperation. Since Takaichi took office, Japan has further expanded its military capabilities, accelerating the SDF's offensive deployment and overseas expansion.
To support this strategic transformation, the Japanese government has completely broken with the unwritten rule after WWII that defense spending should not exceed 1% of its GDP. The total defense budget from FY2023 to FY2027 will reach 43 trillion yen, with defense spending set to meet NATO's standard of 2% of GDP by FY2027. After the Takaichi cabinet took office, Japan advanced the goal of increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP by two years. The massive financial investment will drive the expansion of JSDF in terms of personnel and arsenal, accelerating the research, procurement, and deployment of advanced weaponry to enhance its "counterattack capabilities."
The Japanese Ministry of Defense officially established a new Joint Operations Command in this March, which consolidates the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDFs, as well as space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities, under a unified command. This breaks down coordination barriers between different branches and integrates radar, satellite, drone, and other multi-channel intelligence, establishing a cross-domain joint operation mechanism. This major reform marks a critical transformation in the JSDF's command system from a defensive to an offensive posture. It is one of the most significant organizational changes for the JSDF since its establishment in 1954 and a crucial step in moving its military operational system toward actual combat readiness.
Currently, the JSDF is accelerating the research and procurement of a range of cutting-edge weapons systems with unprecedented intensity, focusing on strengthening stand-off strike and long-range projection capabilities to build a more proactive deterrent military force. Japan is urgently procuring US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and is also fully advancing the modification and development of its Type 12 surface-to-ship missile (SSM). Additionally, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has nearly completed the "carrierization" of its two Izumo-class helicopter destroyers, which now possess the capability to deploy and operate F-35B fighter jets. This means that Japan will have its first light aircraft carriers since WWII, significantly enhancing its maritime operational radius and strike capabilities. Beyond traditional land, sea, and air forces, JSDF is funneling substantial budgets into emerging fields such as space, cyber, and electronic warfare, aiming to gain an information advantage in future "hybrid warfare" scenarios.
Through bilateral military agreements, the normalization of long-range missions, and the expansion of forward bases, Japan is systematically increasing its overseas military presence. Its overseas operations have shifted from traditional non-combat support to regional deployments characterized by combat readiness and enhanced interoperability with allied forces.
In the East Asia region, Japan is using bilateral military security agreements as a means to legitimize and expand its overseas military presence. Following the official implementation of the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement in this September, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) deployed C-130H transport aircraft and 30 personnel to participate in joint exercises at an Air Force Base in Cebu, the Philippines. While framed as "disaster relief" exercises, these drills serve as a prelude to the normalization of JSDF deployments in the Philippines.
In terms of overseas deployments, JSDF has been steadily establishing long-term operational bases and upgrading mission profiles under various pretexts. In Africa, Japan's anti-piracy base in Djibouti has become its first permanent overseas military facility. Simultaneously, the JSDF has expanded its reach by frequently conducting joint military exercises with countries like the US, the UK, and Australia, further extending its operational reach. In September, JSDF deployed F-15 fighter jets and other aircraft to the UK for their first overseas deployment, marking a significant step to deepen Japan-NATO military cooperation.
What is particularly alarming is that the "overseas deployments" of the JSDF are no longer limited to logistical support, as they once were. This dangerous expansion of Japan's overseas military presence not only further undermines the pacifist constitution but also serves as a serious destabilizing factor in the security landscape of East Asia and the Western Pacific.
(The author is from the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies.)