Since the beginning of the year, relations between the US and Iran have undergone dramatic changes. The large-scale deployment of US troops to the Middle East has made military action against Iran appear imminent. On February 4, Washington and Tehran confirmed that they would hold nuclear talks on February 6 in Muscat, the capital of Oman. Analysts note that, against the backdrop of continued US' military threats toward Iran in recent weeks, the prospects for the talks remain highly uncertain, and the risk of renewed confrontation and instability cannot be ruled out.

The upcoming negotiations represent only a temporary easing of tensions in an otherwise highly confrontational situation. Recently, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened military action against Iran, but these threats have yet to be realized, indicating his deep reservations. The US seems intent on achieving maximum benefits with minimal costs, and concerns over the "cost-effectiveness "of military action against Iran have persisted. Moreover, should conflict escalate, it would inevitably lead to regional chaos, a scenario that the US seems unwilling to manage.

For Iran, considering the military power disparity with the US and the pressure from domestic protests, negotiations remain a priority option. Many Middle Eastern countries are concerned about the risk of being caught in the crossfire and have actively worked to mediate and prevent war, providing a significant push for the US-Iran talks. Countries such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt have been instrumental in facilitating dialogue, offering both sides a way to step back from the brink of war.

Analysts point out that the expectations for the latest round of US-Iran talks differ significantly, making a successful agreement difficult to achieve. The US aims to pressure Iran through maximum leverage and military deterrence, hoping to force Iran into accepting a deal that maximizes American interests. Iran's primary goal is to avoid war and eliminate the most pressing threat it currently faces, without rushing to reach substantive results in the negotiations.

Moreover, the two sides lack consensus on the agenda for the talks. The US wishes to include discussions on nuclear issues, ballistic missiles, and regional proxy conflicts, while Iran insists on limiting the talks to the nuclear issue only. This reflects a fundamental divergence between the two nations on issues related to ballistic missiles and regional proxies. At present, among the limited tools available to Iran for safeguarding its national security interests, ballistic missiles remain virtually the only means capable of counterbalancing the US and Israel. Iran is therefore unlikely to abandon the continued development of its ballistic missile capabilities. In recent years, Iran's regional allies have been weakened to varying degrees by the US and Israel, yet it is almost impossible for Tehran to publicly sever ties with them. Moreover, Iran has repeatedly stressed that any concessions are contingent upon the lifting of US sanctions, while Washington shows little intention of easing sanctions in the short term.

Notably, over the past decade and more, the US and Iran have engaged in multiple rounds of contact and negotiations, nearly all of which ended without tangible results. In addition to the issues of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and regional proxies, the US and Iran remain at odds over so-called human rights issues and support for terrorism. The structural contradictions between the two sides, coupled with long-standing mistrust, could affect the progress of negotiations at any time. Should talks fail, the US is highly likely to consider military options. Meanwhile, the US has amassed significant military forces around Iran, and the proximity of US and Iranian vessels and fighter jets increases the risk of accidental conflict. On February 3, the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier (CVN-72) launched fighter jets that shot down an Iranian drone that came too close. If the US implements a naval blockade on Iran, the likelihood of similar incidents would increase significantly.

(The author is from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations）