By Liu Cheng
The NATO recently announced a restructuring of its military command architecture, transferring the command of two Joint Force Commands (JFCs) to European member states. This adjustment is widely viewed as a profound recalibration of NATO's defense responsibility distribution. It is likely to exert a tangible impact on transatlantic alliance dynamics and the broader European security order.
As the world's largest defense alliance, NATO's operational system centers on two strategic commands, namely Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Under ACO, three JFCs are established to coordinate land, maritime, air, space and cyber operations across multiple domains.
Under the latest arrangement, the UK will assume command of NATO's Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFCNF). Located in Norfolk, Virginia of the US, JFCNF takes responsibility for defense planning and operations on NATO's northern flank, the Atlantic, and the Arctic. Italy will take over the Allied Joint Force Command Naples (JFC NAPLES), based on its territory, overseeing operational command in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Balkans. Together with the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum) in the Netherlands, commanded on a rotational basis by German and Polish generals, all three of NATO's operational-level JFCs will be led by European commanders.
However, the transfer of command authority does not mean a strategic withdrawal. The US still retains firm control over the alliance's core command mechanisms. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) continues to be held by a US four-star general, who exercises overall operational command authority for NATO missions across multiple regions. Meanwhile, Washington is set to assume control of NATO's Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), previously headed by the UK, in order to maintain decisive influence over NATO's land, maritime and air command structures, and continue to dominate key areas such as training coordination, capability integration and operational sustainment.
This adjustment reflects the US control strategy of delegating operational-level command while retaining strategic authority, with the aim of shifting defense burdens to Europe systematically while maintaining the alliance's overall military effectiveness. Western observers generally view this move as a direct reflection of the updated defense strategy of the US and its America First doctrine, aimed at urging Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security through institutional arrangements.
According to NATO planning, European member states will take over routine military functions such as intelligence analysis and missile defense, and will account for more than 80 percent of personnel in key operational command posts by 2027. In addition, Europe will be required to shoulder 70 percent of heavy equipment input and 80 percent of intelligence resource expenditure. The US has even proposed that, if European countries raise defense spending to five percent of GDP by 2035, Washington would consider transferring leadership in strategic planning. This "responsibility–investment" linkage mechanism carries a strong transactional implication. Data show that over the past three years, more than 50 percent of Europe's arms procurement spending has flowed to US defense contractors. While advocating European rearmament, the US has simultaneously expanded its arms sales, thereby securing multiple gains.
For Europe, acquiring partial operational command authority also represents a stringent test of its comprehensive military capabilities. NATO has explicitly required that Europe independently organize operational-level joint exercises, conduct rapid troop deployments, and carry out conflict response drills in the future. This means that Europe will not only "take over" operational command authority but also bear concrete responsibilities such as operational planning, force allocation, and crisis response. This move aligns with the EU's Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030and may accelerate the process of European defense integration.
The implementation of the new command structure will still face practical challenges. Coordination within Europe remains difficult, with Germany, France, the UK, and Italy continuing to diverge on force contributions, command authority, and equipment standards. The debate between "defense autonomy" and "reliance on NATO" could intensify further.
A deeper obstacle lies in revising tactical standardization protocols. Currently, most standardization agreements for NATO military operations are formulated under US leadership. How these provisions are adjusted will not only affect the effectiveness of joint force operations but also test the degree of Europe's defense autonomy.
The US devolution of authority this time reflects its deeper strategic anxieties. On one hand, domestic political pressures and global multi-front deployments make it difficult for Washington to sustain high overseas defense costs in the long term. On the other hand, rising centrifugal tendencies among allies are eroding the absolute control of the US over NATO.
Overall, NATO's adjustment of command authority marks a key moment in the reshaping of US-Europe security relations. While the US appears to be relinquishing control, it is in fact carefully orchestrating its strategy; while Europe seems to be taking on authority, it faces multiple pressures in terms of capability and coordination. After this power transition, the transatlantic alliance may enter a period of adjustment fraught with uncertainty.