By Hong Yunxin and Shao Jingkai

At the end of February, the Research Commission on Security of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) approved a draft proposal aimed at expanding the scope of defense equipment exports. The draft calls for abolishing the existing five-category standard, which limits exports to non-lethal purposes, namely rescue, transport, vigilance, surveillance, and minesweeping. In principle, it would allow the export of weapons with lethal capabilities, including fighter jets and naval destroyers. According to Japanese media reports, the proposal is expected to be submitted to the government in early March and could come into effect this spring.

This is not the first time Japan has eased its arms export restrictions. As early as 2014, the cabinet of Shinzo Abe revised the Three Principles on Arms Exports into the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Subsequently, in 2023, the cabinet of Fumio Kishida further amended the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, allowing the export of weapons to licensed partner countries with production authorization. Now, with fresh maneuvering by the government of Sanae Takaichi, even the last red line of not exporting weapons to countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts is set to be removed.

Japan's renewed push to substantially relax arms export restrictions reflects multiple considerations at both the international and domestic levels. At the international level, although the US continues to offer verbal security assurances, skepticism persists within Japan's strategy and policy communities. In response, Japan has accelerated the implementation of a "quasi-alliance" strategy in recent years, seeking to reinforce military alignment with countries such as the Philippines and Australia through defense agreements and expanded arms exports, thereby cultivating potential alternative options beyond reliance on Washington. At the domestic level, right-wing forces in Japan have long argued that the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology constrain the growth of the country's defense industry. In 2024, the total sales revenue of Japan's major defense-related enterprises rose by 40 percent to $13.3 billion. Yet right-wing voices within Japan continue to complain that the scale of its defense industry still lags far behind major global arms manufacturers. Invoking the need to strengthen the domestic defense industrial base as justification for loosening arms export restrictions would, in reality, facilitate Japan's push toward further remilitarization.

Amid the protracted Russia–Ukraine conflict, Japan has followed the US and European countries in providing non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine. In doing so, it appears to believe it has gradually tested the limits of international tolerance, concluding that the evolving international landscape offers a window of opportunity to fully lift longstanding restrictions on arms exports. In fact, Japan's military and security posture has consistently drawn close scrutiny from its Asian neighbors and the broader international community due to its history of aggression. Any move that departs from its self-declared commitment to pacifism is bound to trigger vigilance across the region and beyond.

First, Japan's move to relax restrictions on arms exports runs counter to its long-standing exclusively defense-oriented principle. In the past, Japanese government regarded the non-export of lethal weapons as a concrete manifestation of their commitment to pacifism and the exclusively defense-oriented principle. Even when the cabinets of Shinzo Abe and Fumio Kishida revised the relevant framework, they retained the "five categories" limitation and the restriction on exporting lethal weapons. The current push by the government of Sanae Takaichi to exceptionally permit the export of lethal weapons to countries engaged in conflict would directly cross the bottom line of being confined to the "required minimum self-defense capability." Such a move clearly contravenes the exclusively defense-oriented principle.

Second, Japan's relaxation of arms export restrictions risks impeding efforts toward the peaceful resolution of ongoing geopolitical conflicts. For example, since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Japan has provided Ukraine with assistance totaling approximately $20 billion. Previously, Japan's security assistance to Ukraine was limited to non-lethal equipment. However, following the implementation of the revised Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology under the government of Sanae Takaichi, Japan is highly likely to further conclude a Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with Ukraine, placing Ukraine on the list of destinations eligible for the "exceptional" export of lethal weapons. In fact, Japan has already expressed interest in joining the NATO-led Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) program, under which it could supply US-made ammunition and equipment to Ukraine. Such moves would undoubtedly intensify the protracted nature of the Russia–Ukraine conflict and hinder political efforts aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement.

Finally, Japan's relaxation of arms export restrictions will impact strategic stability in East Asia and beyond. Peace and stability in East Asia hinge upon military and strategic restraint among regional countries. Yet Japan's pursuit of nuclear-powered submarine research and development, along with its enhancement of so-called counterstrike capabilities, will only heighten regional tensions. Further loosening restrictions on arms exports would intensify the offensive orientation and uncertainty of Japan's defense policy, thereby eroding the foundation of mutual trust necessary for maintaining strategic restraint among regional states. This is clearly detrimental to efforts to foster lasting peace and stability in East Asia.

Japan's latest push for a substantial expansion of arms export is therefore not merely a technical adjustment of defense industrial policy. Rather, it represents a significant and potentially hazardous shift in its national security strategy. This move signals a further departure from Japan's postwar identity as a "peace-loving nation," steering it instead toward a more outward-facing and militarily assertive posture. Japan's right-wing forces are seizing every opportunity to break through the constraints of the postwar international order and Japan's own domestic legal framework in pursuit of remilitarization. The international community should respond with firm opposition, working together to defend the victorious outcomes of WWII and the post-war international order.

(The authors are lecturers from the School of Languages, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, and the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University, respectively)

Editor's note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.