By Bao Yi'nan and Cao Qun
Since the large-scale military strikes launched by the US and Israel against Iran on February 28, the conflict in the Gulf region has continued to escalate. Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and has carried out or threatened attacks on commercial vessels. Although Washington has called on countries in Europe, Asia, and the Gulf region to join a maritime escort coalition in the Strait of Hormuz, no country has publicly committed to participating so far. The difficulty in forming the US-proposed maritime escort coalition stems from the complex factors involved in international politics and regional security governance, and also reflects the nuanced attitudes of external countries toward the military actions of the US and Israel, as well as the evolving situation in the Middle East.
From a historical perspective, naval escorts for commercial vessels are nothing new. Today, when maritime security is threatened in certain regions, joint escort operations by multiple navies have become an important means of safeguarding shipping security. However, for multinational escort operations to succeed, three key conditions are usually required, namely clear authorization under international law, broad international cooperation, and a relatively defined and controllable security environment. These conditions, however, are difficult to meet simultaneously in the current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.
On the surface, disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz directly affect global energy supplies, giving many countries a practical interest in restoring maritime traffic. However, following Washington's call to establish a maritime escort coalition, all parties, including its traditional allies, have generally adopted cautious or even evasive attitudes for various underlying reasons.
First, the current security threats in the Strait of Hormuz are far more severe than those seen in typical maritime security incidents. As a littoral state of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran possesses relatively mature asymmetric maritime warfare capabilities, enabling it to target vessels at sea through a range of means, including naval mines, land-based anti-ship missiles, attack drones, and small high-speed boats.
Second, escort operations themselves are extremely complex and costly military missions. To restore the peacetime volume of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime escort coalition might need to provide protection for hundreds of oil tankers each day, an operation that would be highly expensive and protracted. Many countries are also concerned that participating in such escort missions could be seen as aligning with the US and Israel, thereby drawing them directly into the regional conflict and making them potential targets for retaliation by Iran.
Finally, political and legal concerns cannot be overlooked. Unlike the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the US-proposed maritime escort coalition in the Strait of Hormuz lacks clear authorization from the UN. For most external countries, maintaining relative neutrality and promoting de-escalation at this stage is evidently more consistent with both legitimacy and moral considerations. Therefore, from security risks and military costs to political considerations, the convergence of multiple factors makes it difficult for the US-proposed maritime escort coalition to gain active support in the short term.
The root cause of the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz lies not in shipping itself, but in the ongoing escalation of the military conflict. The US and Israel have, in violation of the UN Charter, launched military strikes against Iran, directly leading to a sharp deterioration of the regional situation and plunging the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global energy corridor, into instability. Under such circumstances, relying solely on naval escort operations cannot fundamentally resolve the problem.
Historical experience has repeatedly shown that unilateral actions bypassing the UN often end up isolated and lacking support. Many countries, including the UK, Australia, and Japan, have shown clear caution or even reluctance toward participating in escort operations. This indicates that even traditional US allies harbor significant doubts about the legitimacy and consequences of the current military actions.
In the long run, only by returning to an international system centered on the UN, upholding an international order based on international law, and resolving differences through dialogue and negotiation can the parties to the conflict truly ease tensions in the Gulf region and restore shipping security in the Strait of Hormuz. For the global energy market and the world economy, stability is far more important than confrontation. The future situation in the Strait of Hormuz will, to a large extent, depend on whether the parties involved are willing to return to the track of dialogue and negotiation.
(The authors are respectively an associate research fellow at Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, and a research fellow at the Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies)
Editor's note: Originally published on china.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
