By Guan Zhaoyu
This year marks the 80th anniversary of the opening of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, commonly known as the Tokyo Trials. Eighty years ago, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, based on international law, tried Japan's crimes of aggression and delivered a historic judgment on the war of aggression launched by Japan. The Tokyo Trials not only brought war criminals to justice, but also fundamentally repudiated the path of Japanese militarism. It clarified historical responsibility and, more importantly, established the legal boundaries for the postwar international order.
A series of instruments with legal effect under international law, including the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, all contain explicit legal provisions requiring that Japan must return occupied territories, disarm, and accept postwar arrangements, and must not return to a path of aggression and expansion. In this context, the Tokyo Trials, in the form of international law, established Japan's responsibility for militarist aggression, holding accountable those chiefly responsible for planning, initiating, and carrying out the war of aggression. It advanced Japan's postwar demilitarization, compelled it to renounce the right to wage war, restricted its military capabilities, and bound it to a pacifist Constitution. It made clear to the world that wars of aggression cannot be excused by their outcomes and those who initiate war must bear legal responsibility. Militarism is not a historical option that can be glorified, but a criminal path that must be thoroughly rejected.
Eighty years later, the series of dangerous moves under the Takaichi administration is severely eroding this established boundary. From making erroneous statements on the Taiwan question and allowing right-wing politicos to visit Taiwan, to advancing constitutional revision and military expansion, strengthening intelligence capabilities, loosening restrictions on arms exports, and promoting narratives of "prolonged warfare," Japan's rightward political shift is no longer merely a regression in historical views. It has increasingly translated into real risks in security policy, state institutions, and regional strategy.
With the slogan of building a "strong Japan" and "safeguarding national interests" as its political tone, Takaichi presents an image of strengthening national capability and strategic autonomy. In essence, however, this is fully aligned with the long-standing agenda of Japan's right wing to break away from the postwar system. What they call "breaking away" is not simply institutional reform, but an attempt to cast off the constraints imposed by the pacifist Constitution, the Tokyo Trials, and the postwar international order on Japan's remilitarization.
What most alarming is the Takaichi administration's blatant crossing of red lines on the Taiwan question. On November 7, 2025, during a response in the Japanese Diet, Sanae Takaichi forcibly linked a "Taiwan emergency" with a so-called survival-threatening situation for Japan, under which Japan could exercise the right of collective self-defense, directly tying Japan's security policy to the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, Japanese right-wing politicos have continued to send erroneous signals to "Taiwan independence" forces. Furuya Keiji has frequently made tout visits to Taiwan and colluded with "Taiwan independence" separatist forces, seriously violating the one-China principle and the spirit of the four political documents between China and Japan . China's lawful countermeasures against him constitute a necessary response to Japan's right-wing challenge to China's red line.
On historical issues, the Takaichi administration also shows a lack of reflection. Japanese right-wing politicos have frequently engaged in wrongful actions concerning the Yasukuni Shrine, the evaluation of war criminals, and Japan's history of aggression. The Yasukuni Shrine honors the Class-A war criminals who were directly responsible for Japan's war of aggression. It is a spiritual tool and symbol of Japanese militarists' war of aggression. Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine are not merely personal acts of mourning but deliberate political acts that blur the boundaries between aggression and defeat, between perpetrators and victims, and between war criminals and war dead. Once history is deliberately downplayed and responsibility for militarism is repackaged, efforts to expand armaments and revise the constitution can acquire a misleading and dangerous historical justification.
China's firm defense of the outcomes of the Tokyo Trials is, at its core, a defense of historical justice, international rule of law, and regional peace. China was one of the principal victims of Japanese militarist aggression, and the Chinese people made enormous sacrifices for the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War. The Tokyo Trials' legal characterization and judgment of Japan's crimes of aggression are not only a matter of China's historical memory, but also a matter of the shared dignity of all Asian countries that suffered under that aggression. Any attempts to deny the Tokyo Trials, downplay wartime responsibility, or glorify militarism constitute a secondary harm to the people of victimized countries and a challenge to human conscience. History cannot be selectively forgotten, law cannot be rewritten through political opportunism, and the postwar order must not be undermined by right-wing forces. The significance of the Tokyo Trials lies not only in prosecuting war criminals of the past, but also in warning future generations. Only by genuinely learning from history and firmly adhering to a path of peaceful development can Japan earn the trust of its Asian neighbors and the broader international community. If it persists in historical revisionism, plays with fire on the Taiwan question, and takes military security risks, it will ultimately lead itself back into a dangerous course.
(The author is a specialist of East Asian studies from the China Youth University of Political Studies)
Editor's note: Originally published on china.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.