By Jiang Shuiyao

Japan fired its Type 88 shore-based anti-ship missile system during the US-Philippines Balikatan joint military exercise in waters off Luzon Island in the Philippines on May 6. It marks the first time in 81 years since the end of WWII that Japan has launched an offensive missile outside its territory. In the special year marking the 80th anniversary of the opening of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, commonly known as the Tokyo Trials, Japan's right-wing forces use this missile to send a message to the world: the constraints of Article 9 of the pacifist Constitution have become little more than a formality.

The launch site carries special political significance. It was fired from the coast of Luzon Island, facing the South China Sea and only about 400 kilometers from the southern tip of Taiwan Island. For China, this is a highly provocative strategic signal.

This move marks that Japan's military expansion has torn away the disguise of gradual incremental breakthroughs. Previously, Japan's overseas military involvement had largely taken the form of dispatching observers, participating in humanitarian relief operations, and providing logistical support, constantly skirting the edge of established rules. This time, however, Japan joined the US-Philippines joint exercise as a formal participant and launched an offensive missile outside its territory. This is nothing less than an open showdown, revealing its attempt to completely break free from the constraints of the postwar system.

This missile launch is by no means an isolated incident. Japan's recent moves to strengthen its military and expand its warfighting capabilities clearly demonstrate its systematic path of hollowing out the pacifist Constitution.

First, Japan has continued to loosen legal and institutional constraints. At the end of 2022, Japan revised its three national security documents and openly proposed developing so-called "counterstrike capabilities," effectively denying the "exclusively defense-oriented" principle in legal terms. Since Sanae Takaichi took office, the process of constitutional revision has entered the fast track. Her cabinet has successively reshaped Japan's military system through both legislative and administrative means: Japan's defense budget for fiscal year 2026 exceeded 9 trillion yen, reaching a record high; a new national intelligence agency was established, widely criticized as the revival of the wartime Special Higher Police; the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) restored the old imperial military title of "taisa" (colonel) for the rank previously known as "issa" (first field officer); and in April this year, the Japanese cabinet again revised the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, formally lifting restrictions on the export of lethal weapons. This series of moves has, in effect, constituted de facto constitutional revision through legal interpretation and institutional restructuring.

Second, Japan is accelerating the establishment of a military-industrial export system. Following the loosening of restrictions, the destinations for Japanese arms exports have expanded to 17 partner countries. Its frigate deal with Australia, worth tens of billions of US dollars, has set a postwar record for the largest single defense export order in Japan's history. Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and the Philippine defense secretary on May 5 reached a consensus to establish a practical consultation mechanism on the export of second-hand frigates. At the same time, Japan is advancing the Global Combat Air Programme together with the UK and Italy to jointly develop the sixth-generation stealth fighter. From multilateral joint military-industrial research and development to the export of mature weapons systems, Japan has already built a complete chain for military sales expansion.

Third, Japan is normalizing overseas force deployment. This year's Balikatan joint exercise brought together more than 17,000 troops from seven countries, including the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. Japan deployed around 1,400 personnel to participate, and its Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade also carried out live-fire drills on Luzon Island. From the formalization of its participation status to the institutionalization of logistical support and the normalization of involvement in joint exercises, Japan is turning the territory of other countries into training grounds for its military.

Taken together, these three paths clearly outline the contours of Japan's neo-militarism. This is not a simple repetition of historical militarism, but rather the gradual construction of a complete system for overseas military intervention, which uses so-called "security cooperation" as a cover, legal deregulation as a breakthrough point, arms exports as the linkage, and overseas military presence as the strategic foothold.

Japan's military moves are having multiple impacts on the regional security landscape. The "exclusively defense-oriented" principle, once a key pillar of the postwar security order in East Asia, has now been reduced to little more than a formality, together with Article 9 of the pacifist Constitution. Japan's overseas launch of an offensive missile has set a dangerous precedent. In the future, its overseas deployments under the banner of so-called "security cooperation" will only become more frequent. Meanwhile, the deepening military convergence among the US, Japan, and the Philippines is pushing the Philippines to the front line of major power confrontation. As a result, security risks in both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait are bound to rise sharply.

The postwar international order must not be overturned. The international community must remain highly vigilant against Japan's right-wing forces, which are determined to return to the old path of militarism. If Japan's right wing remains obsessed with this dead-end path, it will inevitably suffer the consequences of its own actions.

(The author is an assistant research fellow of the Center for International Studies, Shandong Academy of Social Sciences)

Editor's note: Originally published on china.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.