By Ling Yunzhi

According to news reports by CCTV, the Iranian side stated that European countries have begun contacts and coordination with the naval forces of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) regarding navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Previously, the UK and France jointly hosted an online meeting on May 12 attended by defense representatives from more than 40 countries. The participants agreed to design a defensive naval escort framework for the Strait of Hormuz, while explicitly excluding US command.

The fact that European countries have now engaged directly with Iran's IRGC on navigation issues in the Strait of Hormuz without involving the US marks a profound adjustment in the EU's policy toward Iran. It not only reflects the EU's strong desire to break away from dependence on US security guarantees and pursue strategic autonomy, but also exposes its multiple dilemmas in military capability, internal coordination, and strategic competition with Iran. If successfully advanced, the EU's latest initiative could reshape the maritime security landscape in the Middle East and have far-reaching implications for the US, Iran, and other regional actors.

The EU's push for an escort mission in the Strait of Hormuz represents a major practical step in implementing its long-standing policy of strategic autonomy in the Middle East. Since the Trump administration withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal and resumed sanctions against Iran, the EU has consistently attempted to play the role of mediator between the US and Iran to safeguard its diplomatic credibility and economic interests. 

However, following the outbreak of the Iran conflict in February 2026 and the continued escalation of regional tensions, the EU has come to realize that political dialogue alone is no longer sufficient to protect its core interests in the Middle East. As the Strait of Hormuz carries a significant share of global oil transportation, European countries are highly dependent on this energy corridor. By choosing to project a military presence into the Strait of Hormuz under the framework of Operation Aspides, the EU is essentially attempting to build a regional security mechanism with reduced reliance on the US through concrete action. This marks a substantive shift in its policy toward Iran from "diplomatic mediation" toward "military escort operations."

Although the EU's intention to adjust its policy on the Strait of Hormuz is clear, it faces multiple practical difficulties in implementation, the most prominent being the huge gap between its military capabilities and strategic objectives. Iran has deployed a large number of shore-based anti-ship missiles, fast attack craft, and naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz, giving it significant advantages in asymmetric warfare. By contrast, EU naval forces mainly consist of large destroyers and frigates, which lack effective means to counter swarming attacks by small drones and armed fast boats. More importantly, the EU lacks independent space-based reconnaissance and real-time intelligence surveillance systems, and remains highly dependent on the US for information on Iranian military activities. Should the US refuse to share intelligence, the EU's escort operations would face the risk of "operating in the dark," exposing the fragile practical foundation of its strategic autonomy.

In addition, some Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Cyprus maintain certain economic ties with Iran and therefore remain cautious about fully confronting Tehran. Such internal divisions directly undermine the political legitimacy of EU actions and weaken the level of resource commitment behind them. Although the meeting of more than 40 countries held on May 12 reached a consensus in principle, bargaining among member states over key issues such as the number of ships to be deployed, rules of engagement, and command structures is likely to continue. As a result, the EU's military presence in the Strait of Hormuz may ultimately become largely symbolic.

Finally, a major dilemma facing the EU's policy toward Iran lies in its inability to effectively reconcile differences with the US. Europe's explicit exclusion of US command this time demonstrates its intention to pursue strategic autonomy, but it has also triggered strong dissatisfaction from Washington. It is foreseeable that if the EU continues advancing this plan, the US may adopt retaliatory measures, such as restricting intelligence sharing with Europe or imposing secondary sanctions on European companies participating in the operation. This would place the EU in a dilemma between maintaining the transatlantic alliance and pursuing strategic autonomy.

For a long time, the US has been the dominant actor in Gulf security affairs. The US Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain, has long been responsible for safeguarding navigation security in the Strait of Hormuz. Europe's decision to build a separate mechanism this time essentially challenges the role of the US as the "security sheriff" in the Middle East. If the EU succeeds in establishing an independent escort framework, it could greatly encourage other regional countries or organizations to create maritime security arrangements outside the US-led framework, thereby accelerating the marginalization of the US within the Middle East security architecture. As a result, the regional security landscape could shift from "US unipolar dominance" toward a more complex structure characterized by "parallel US-EU influence and competition among multiple parties," which in the short term may intensify rather than ease regional tensions.

Editor's note: Originally published on thepaper.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.