By Hai Feng

Since the meeting between the Chinese and U.S. presidents in mid-May, four notable developments concerning the Taiwan question have emerged in just half a month. Together, they send a signal that China and the US are engaged in a new round of cautious and pragmatic re-calibration on the Taiwan question.

The first development is that US President Donald Trump has postponed a phone call with Lai Ching-te. According to recent US media reports, Trump will defer speaking with Lai before Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the US this autumn. This development is highly significant. According to reports, Trump had twice indicated after his visit to China that he would speak with Lai. The shift from intending to hold the call to postponing it suggests that the US side has gained a deeper understanding of the Taiwan question and has begun tightening the pace of its actions while exercising greater control over potential risks.

The second development is that the US has delayed a planned arms sale to Taiwan. According to foreign media reports, a proposed arms package for Taiwan valued at approximately US$14 billion has yet to receive approval. This likewise suggests that, following the meeting between the two presidents, the US has begun reassessing the priority it assigns to the Taiwan question and is seeking to avoid actions that could disrupt the broader trajectory of China-US relations. Particularly at a time when fighting in the Middle East remains intense, ammunition stockpiles are under strain, and pressure on global military resource allocation is increasing. The decision to postpone arms sales to Taiwan reflects an even more pronounced element of strategic pragmatism.

The third development is that the US side has noticeably toned down its rhetoric on the Taiwan question at this year's Shangri-La Dialogue. This is perhaps the most visible change. In his formal address at the Dialogue on May 30, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth did not mention Taiwan a single time. By comparison, he referred to Taiwan five times at the same event last year. It is particularly noteworthy that this was the first comprehensive public statement by the US defense secretary following the mid-May meeting between the Chinese and U.S. presidents. Throughout the speech, he made a clear effort to reflect and uphold President Trump's overall approach of handling the Taiwan question with caution. Even more strikingly, Pete Hegseth not only refrained from mentioning Taiwan, but also noticeably moderated the intensity of his criticism of China.

The fourth development is that although Lai's "Taiwan independence" stance has not changed, his rhetoric has shown signs of adjustment. Within half a month, changes have also emerged in the public statements of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities. On May 17, Lai stated that there was no "Taiwan independence" issue on his part. Shortly thereafter, in his May 20 remarks, although his entrenched "Taiwan independence" position remained unchanged, his wording appeared to be somewhat more restrained. This at least indicates that, following the meeting between the Chinese and U.S. presidents, the Taiwan authorities have also sensed changes in the external environment and have had to make certain adjustments in their rhetoric. To put it bluntly, if the US itself has stated that it does not support "Taiwan independence," how could the DPP continue to ignore this shift?

The underlying reason for the four developments described above is in fact not complicated. At its core, China and the US have reached a certain consensus following the summit between the two heads of state on properly handling the Taiwan question and stabilizing the situation across the Taiwan Strait.

First, the Taiwan question has always been the most important and sensitive issue in China-US relations. China has repeatedly emphasized to the US that if the Taiwan question is not handled properly, it could lead to confrontation or even conflict between the two countries. Given that both sides have already agreed to establish a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability as the new framework for bilateral relations, the most immediate area requiring de-escalation and risk control is naturally the Taiwan question.

Second, the Trump administration itself places extreme emphasis on presidential authority and transactional logic. Trump regards the Taiwan question as a highly sensitive "bargaining chip" in his strategic competition with China. To pave the way for future interactions between the two heads of state, he would naturally not allow subordinates to take unnecessary risks on the Taiwan question, nor would he want to see the Taiwan-related agenda spiral out of control.

Third, the Lai authorities have also taken note of the changing situation. They are by no means willing to abandon their "Taiwan independence" position. However, in the context of a more restrained US tone and a relatively stabilizing situation in the Taiwan Strait, they have had to moderate their rhetoric to some extent to avoid overly confrontational or reckless moves that could risk losing US support.

These four developments can be understood as a chain reaction within the process of building a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability. Over the past half a month, the US side has been making pragmatic adjustments around the most sensitive issue of the Taiwan question. Such adjustments indicate that both China and the US are working to manage differences, expand common ground, and guide stability and peace, reflecting the rationality and maturity expected of major powers. This is also what the international community has broadly anticipated.

Editor's Note: Originally published on opinion.huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.