By Yang Jiucheng and Duan Ting

In late May, Japan announced that four active-duty Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel would be assigned to the headquarters of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). At a deeper level, Japan's move is intended to further bind itself to NATO, continue breaking through the constraints of its "exclusively defense-oriented" principle, and accelerate the advancement of a strategic posture characterized by befriending distant states and attacking neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region.

Deepening strategic alignment with NATO

Since the end of the Cold War, against the backdrop of Japan's pursuit of a greater international role and NATO's efforts to extend its strategic reach worldwide, the two sides have steadily strengthened strategic communication in various forms.

In the 21st century, Japan's neo-militarism has gradually gained momentum and frictions with neighboring countries have become more pronounced, prompting Tokyo to significantly intensify its efforts to cultivate closer ties with NATO.

Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, military cooperation between Japan and NATO has entered a phase of rapid expansion, ranging from coordinated support for Ukraine and transregional joint exercises and training to enhanced cooperation on defense industrial and supply chains. Japan has actively participated in NATO summits, foreign ministers' meetings, and defense ministers' meetings, positioning itself as a leading member of the so-called "Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)," comprising Japan, the ROK, Australia, and New Zealand.

These developments have not only served Japan's ambitions associated with neo-militarism, but have also provided Tokyo with an important political instrument for further binding itself to NATO and reinforcing long-term US engagement in the region. In particular, Japan's decision to dispatch four active-duty JSDF personnel to the headquarters of NSATU signals an effort to elevate military cooperation with NATO from the realm of non-combat activities to one more closely associated with operational military functions, while seeking to move the relationship beyond a conventional partnership toward a quasi-alliance.

Further eroding the "exclusively defense-oriented" principle

Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has emphasized that the deployment is intended to learn various lessons from the battlefield in Ukraine. Such remarks appear designed to obscure a deeper objective: further breaking through the constraints of the "exclusively defense-oriented" principle.

First, by highlighting emerging modes of warfare involving artificial intelligence, low-Earth orbit satellite communications, and unmanned systems, Japan is accelerating its transition toward intelligent and unmanned combat capabilities, thereby further eroding the limits that the "exclusively defense-oriented" principle has traditionally imposed on the capabilities and activities of the JSDF.

Second, by hyping up the attritional nature of the Ukraine crisis, Japan is promoting the importance of systematically building institutions and mechanisms capable of sustaining long-term military operations. This could facilitate an expansion of military authority, accelerate the formation of a military-industrial complex, increase stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, and promote the dual military-civilian use of critical infrastructure, developments that would move Japan further away from the spirit of its pacifist Constitution.

Finally, the deployment itself creates a precedent for integrating JSDF personnel into a NATO military command structure. Such a precedent could serve as a stepping stone for future overseas deployments of Japanese military forces beyond the framework of the US-Japan alliance.

Accelerating a strategy of cultivating distant partners while expanding influence in nearby regions

Japan and NATO are, in essence, engaged in a mutually beneficial partnership in which each side seeks to advance its own strategic interests. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Japan has been willing to devote substantial resources to supporting NATO's efforts in what it characterizes as a "proxy war" in Ukraine. Its ultimate objective, however, is to secure strategic dividends from NATO in the Asia-Pacific region.

First, Japan seeks greater policy coordination. With Japan's encouragement, NATO and several of its major member states have significantly increased their involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs, particularly those concerning East Asia.

Second, Japan seeks enhanced military cooperation and support. Japan has successively concluded military cooperation agreements with NATO and its key member states, including the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)and the Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, while the frequency and scale of joint exercises and training activities have continued to expand.

Finally, Japan seeks operational support. Emerging domains of warfare, including cyberspace, outer space, and the cognitive domain, have become priority areas of cooperation between Japan and NATO. In the traditional domains of land, sea, and air operations, Japan also hopes to leverage the fact that the US is both NATO's leading member and Japan's treaty ally. Through this dual connection, Tokyo expects that, in regional conflicts involving the US, it could benefit from indirect operational support provided by NATO.

Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has repeatedly pursued a strategy of engaging distant powers while confronting its neighbors, exploiting external alignments to advance its agenda at the expense of regional stability. Such ventures ultimately failed. The international community should therefore remain vigilant and take concrete measures to prevent history from repeating itself.

(The authors are associate professors at the College of National Security, PLA National Defense University.)