By Zhou Shengsheng and Cai Liang

At present, neo-militarism in Japan is accelerating its penetration into the economic sphere. Japan's fiscal policies, industrial structure, technological research and development, and even social governance are all gradually shifting toward military priorities. The ultimate goal is to break through the constraints imposed by the pacifist Constitution at the economic level and restore Japan's capacity to wage war.

The resurgence of a "war economy" is inseparable from Japan's continued policy and institutional relaxation of restrictions in the defense sector. In particular, since the adoption of the three national security documents in 2022, Japan's defense spending has increased by approximately 1 trillion yen annually, nearly doubling over four years. The defense budget proposed for fiscal year 2026 has surpassed the 9 trillion yen mark for the first time, setting a new record. 

A key feature of Japan's defense budget for fiscal year 2026 is that approximately 973.3 billion yen will be concentrated on developing long-range counterstrike capabilities. Such capabilities are designed to strike coastal and even inland targets of an adversary from a distance of 1,000 kilometers or more. In essence, these represent an expansion of offensive capabilities and have clearly exceeded the scope of the "exclusively defense-oriented" principle.

The Japanese government has also relied on the National Security Strategy and the Economic Security Promotion Act to strengthen the role of the economy in supporting military objectives. It has incorporated sectors such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence into the national security framework and, through the "specific-use airports and ports" system, promoted the conversion of civilian infrastructure for military purposes. At the same time, under the framework of integrating military functions into civilian infrastructure, Japan has sought to incorporate routine municipal infrastructure development into wartime mobilization plans.

Japan has also broken the postwar academic taboo against conducting military-related research. In June 2025, a bill to transform the Science Council of Japan, a governmental agency, into a corporate entity was passed amid strong opposition. Japan Ministry of Defense subsequently established the Defense Science and Technology Board, bringing in a number of active university professors as members and using substantial research funding to promote the mobilization of academia for military purposes.

Japan's right-wing forces' rapid push for military expansion, combined with the country's economic downturn, is contributing to the formation of a "war economy" structure.

First, Japan's military buildup has directly fueled industrial growth. In recent years, orders received by Japanese defense contractors have surged. According to financial reports for fiscal year 2024, Japan's three major heavy industry companies, namely Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and IHI Corporation, all recorded their highest-ever profits. As of the end of March this year, the combined backlog of defense-related orders held by the three companies reached 6.25 trillion yen, up 15 percent from the previous fiscal year.

Second, Japan has repeatedly relaxed restrictions on arms exports. On April 18 this year, Japan and Australia signed an agreement confirming the export of the Mogami-class frigate, marking the first time since WWII that Japan has exported a large naval vessel equipped with lethal capabilities. The Sanae Takaichi administration officially revised the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology on April 21, in principle allowing the export of finished defense equipment, including lethal weapons. Japan's defense industry is accelerating its transformation toward an export-oriented model. Meanwhile, the convergence of interests among Japan's political circles, defense companies, financial capital, think tanks, and security institutions has re-emerged, with a prewar-like military-industrial complex structure being rebuilt.

Finally, Japan has deliberately promoted crisis narratives. Japan has propagated claims such as "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency" and so-called China maritime threat, using them as pretexts to expand defense spending, deploy missiles, and militarize infrastructure. During this year's US-Philippines Balikatan joint military exercise, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) not only dispatched a large number of personnel to participate for the first time, but also openly fired two Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles on Philippine territory. This marks the first time since the end of WWII that Japan has launched offensive missiles outside its territory. The political logic behind this move is clear: to create a sense of "security urgency" through combat-oriented actions and provide justification for further military expansion.

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the opening of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, commonly known as the Tokyo Trials. The Tokyo Trials, the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, as well as Japan's Instrument of Surrender and pacifist Constitution, together constitute a postwar international legal framework with binding force. The Tokyo Trials' determination that Japan must permanently abandon military expansion is by no means merely a moral requirement. Japan's return to a path of military expansion would amount to a violation of its surrender commitments and the postwar international order, undermining the foundation of peace in the Asia-Pacific region. All forces that cherish peace around the world, including the Chinese people, must remain highly vigilant against the resurgence of Japan's "war economy" and safeguard, through all necessary means, the hard-won peace and stability of the region.

(The authors are, respectively, an assistant research fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Studies and the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, and a research fellow and director of the Center for Northeast Asian Studies of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies)

Editor's Note: Originally published on people.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.