By Wu Minwen
The annual NATO summit was held in Ankara, Türkiye, on July 7 and 8. Against the backdrop of Donald Trump's second term in the White House — during which he has repeatedly disparaged NATO allies, called for withdrawing US troops from Europe, and threatened to pull the United States out of the alliance — the US-proposed "NATO 3.0" concept has become a focus of widespread attention.
The concept of "NATO 3.0" was put forward by Elbridge Colby, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, at the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers held in Brussels on February 12 this year. As a regional military alliance, NATO was established against the geopolitical backdrop of confrontation between the US- and Soviet-led blocs during the Cold War. After the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact dissolved, NATO not only survived but also continued to expand. This has become a direct cause of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and an important driver behind the emergence of the "NATO 3.0" concept.
In the "NATO 1.0" era — the Cold War period — despite intense confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and crises such as the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, NATO remained fundamentally a regional defensive alliance. Overall, it prevented direct confrontation between the two military blocs from escalating into a large-scale hot war.
In the "NATO 2.0" era, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO emerged as the dominant military alliance and embarked on a course of expansion despite the end of the Cold War. During this period, it gradually evolved from a regional defensive organization into a military alliance engaged in out-of-area intervention. At the same time, NATO expanded rapidly in terms of membership. In 2020, North Macedonia formally joined the alliance, marking NATO's fifth round of post-Cold War enlargement and bringing its membership to 30. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022, Finland and Sweden joined NATO, increasing the number of member states to 32.
The "NATO 3.0" era refers to the new phase of the alliance as defined by the Trump administration. Elbridge Colby, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, has stated that NATO should return to its original principles of deterrence and defense; become "more European", with Europe assuming greater responsibility for its own defense and member states raising annual defense spending to 5% of GDP; and reduce member states' dependence on the United States, while ensuring that the United States remains "firmly rooted" in NATO and European defense. Put simply, European members are expected to assume greater defense responsibilities and bear higher defense costs, while the United States continues to retain firm control over the alliance.
The emergence of the "NATO 3.0" concept signifies that NATO's existing structure and its model for allocating responsibilities and obligations are no longer sustainable. It represents an attempt to explore new structures, models, and relationships in order to prolong the life of an organization that was born under Cold War conditions and has long since outlived its time. Whether "NATO 3.0" can achieve that goal, however, remains to be seen.
First, "NATO 3.0" is not an upgrade but a compromise. Under this arrangement, the United States remains within NATO while reducing its defense burden, and Europe assumes greater defense responsibilities in exchange for the US nuclear umbrella and broader security commitments. Under the current circumstances, such a compromise may represent the most practical solution for both sides.
Second, the path toward European defense autonomy remains long and challenging. European defense autonomy is by no means a new idea. In 1992, France and Germany spearheaded the establishment of the Eurocorps, which was later joined by 10 countries, including Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, and Poland, with its troop strength peaking at more than 60,000. Yet the initiative ultimately failed to achieve its intended objectives, largely because it could not overcome US resistance. The same logic underlies the US-proposed "NATO 3.0": while urging European countries to increase defense spending and assume greater security responsibilities, the United States also insists on remaining "firmly rooted" in European defense and is unwilling to relinquish its leadership role.
Third, the transatlantic rift will not be easily bridged. Under pressure from Trump, annual defense spending by NATO's European allies and Canada has risen sharply — from US$285.4 billion in 2018 to US$372.0 billion in 2022, and further to US$634.0 billion in 2026. The sharp increase in defense spending, coupled with Europe's growing responsibility for its own security, will inevitably strengthen its pursuit of strategic autonomy and encourage more independent action.
Regarding "NATO 3.0", the NATO framework will continue to serve the long-term interests of both the United States and Europe. However, the strategic trust, logic of cooperation, and alliance relationship between the two sides have undergone fundamental changes. The rifts that have emerged are unlikely to be repaired or bridged.
Editor's note: Originally published on zqb.cyol.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
