By Liu Shaodong
Japan's Kyodo News recently disclosed that the total budget requests from Japanese government ministries and agencies for Fiscal Year 2027 (April 2027 to March 2028) are expected to top 130 trillion yen (approximately US$817.8 billion). Among them, Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD) plans to request approximately 8.9 trillion yen (US$56.1 billion) to fund the deployment of interceptor drones and other capabilities. The requested amount would mark a record high and could ultimately rise further.
The MOD's plan to carry out a large-scale organizational expansion in 2027 was well within the expectations of the Japanese media. Notably, it intends to create three new bureaus, tentatively named as a "defense infrastructure bureau," an "international policy bureau," and a "facilities policy bureau"—without abolishing any existing departments.
The simultaneous creation of three new bureaus represents a "highly unusual" administrative expansion, breaking with Japan's administrative reform convention that the creation of a new department requires the abolition of an existing one. This move exposes Japan's strategic ambition to accelerate its efforts to break through the constraints of its "exclusively defense-oriented" policy and extend its military influence overseas on a regular basis.
Judging from the prospective roles of the three new bureaus, the "defense infrastructure bureau" will oversee logistical affairs for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), including transportation, supply, and medical and health services, with the core objective of "ensuring sustained combat capability." The shift from an "exclusively defense-oriented" posture to preparations for "protracted warfare" lays bare the Japanese government's ambition to undermine the post-war peace system.
The "international policy bureau" will specifically manage military cooperation projects with other nations, weaving a global network of military cooperation to provide diplomatic and institutional support for a new round of military expansion. It is not difficult to imagine that Japan, under the pretext of a "growing threat from China and Russia," will court countries in Europe, Southeast Asia, Oceania and elsewhere to promote cooperation through Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs), joint exercises, technology transfers, and intelligence sharing. Japan is attempting to use such efforts to build a "quasi-alliance" network centered on itself and, in coordination with the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy," strategically contain China.
The "facilities policy bureau" will oversee the maintenance and management of facilities at JSDF and US Forces Japan (USFJ) bases. While this may appear to concern infrastructure, it will in essence strengthen the physical links underpinning US-Japan military integration. At the same time, the bureau will coordinate the expansion and functional upgrading of JSDF bases, providing infrastructure support for the deployment of offensive capabilities such as long-range missiles, drones, and command centers. The "facilities policy bureau" is precisely an institutional instrument for building up the infrastructure needed for offensive military capabilities. Such an approach to thoroughly militarizing domestic bases is tantamount to turning Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and repeating the mistake of fortifying its home territory during World War II.
From the "defense infrastructure bureau" and the "international policy bureau" to the "facilities policy bureau," this expansion is by no means an isolated administrative reform, but a key link in Japan's accelerating "remilitarization." Domestically, Japan is building a logistical system for sustained operations and bringing social resources comprehensively into the service of militarization; externally, it is weaving a military cooperation network to support the expansion of offensive military capabilities in an attempt to reshape the regional order.
Currently, the Takaichi administration is pursuing a three-pronged approach of institutional expansion, budget increases, and legal revisions to bring the country's political, economic, social, and technological resources onto a militarized track. From the National Mobilization Law of 1938 to the nationwide momentum toward war preparedness in 2026, Japan is making a comprehensive institutional return to the pre-WWII "war system."
History has long proven that any scheme to achieve "great power status" through military expansion and foreign aggression will inevitably face resolute resistance from the peoples of Asia and the world, as well as international forces of justice. The "China threat" narrative constantly hyped by Japan is, in essence, a pretext for its own military buildup. This cycle of "threat narrative—military buildup and war preparations—heightened tensions" is eroding the foundations of regional peace. If Japan insists on going its own path and returning to the old path of militarism, it will inevitably repeat the mistakes of history and suffer the consequences. The international community should take concerted action to prevent Japan's runaway chariot of "remilitarization" from hurtling toward a dangerous abyss.
(The author is a professor and the director of the institute of Sino-Japanese relations at Tianjin University of Technology)
Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.