By Zhan Debin
The US, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on September 7 launched a multi-domain joint military exercise code-named Freedom Edge. As usual, the three countries claimed that the exercise aims to address the nuclear and missile threats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and safeguard regional peace and stability, and that it constitutes a "defensive" annual training. However, viewed in the context of recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, the true intentions behind this arrangement still merit careful consideration.
Not long ago, US President Donald Trump repeatedly signaled a desire to resume US-DPRK summit talks and scaled back portions of the ROK-US "Ulchi Freedom Shield" exercise on the grounds of avoiding provoking the DPRK. Meanwhile, ROK President Lee Jae Myung has also reiterated a blueprint for inter-Korean peaceful coexistence on multiple occasions, emphasizing the need to reduce hostility, manage crises, and promote the transition from the armistice regime to a peace regime.
Since both the US and the ROK are talking about peace, dialogue, and easing tensions, the trilateral US-Japan-ROK military exercise—which is more sensitive and has greater regional spillover effects—should be handled with all the more prudence.
This is because basic consistency must be maintained between military deterrence and political dialogue. If they call for peaceful coexistence while continuing to conduct multinational joint military exercises, or signal a willingness for dialogue while strengthening multi-domain coordination, information sharing, and integrated missile defense, the credibility of their peace rhetoric will naturally be compromised.
US aircraft carriers did not participate in this year's Freedom Edge exercise, but this should not be over-interpreted as a positive signal to the DPRK. The US side explained that the absence of aircraft carriers was due to the need to meet global operational demands and did not mean that the US was weakening its commitment to the so-called "Indo-Pacific security."
More directly, this reflects the pressure the US faces in deploying its forces globally rather than an easing of its security policy toward Northeast Asia. Packaging such practical difficulties as strategic restraint is neither conducive to an accurate assessment of the situation by the outside world nor helpful for genuinely de-escalating tensions on the Peninsula.
What merits even greater concern is that the impact of Freedom Edge exercise is clearly not confined to the Korean Peninsula. While official statements from the US, Japan, and the ROK emphasize its "defensive" nature, remarks by senior US and Japanese officials in recent years increasingly reveal that trilateral military cooperation is being incorporated into the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy," deployment along the First Island Chain, and a comprehensive framework aimed at containing China, Russia, and the DPRK. By emphasizing information sharing, multi-domain coordination, and integrated air and missile defense among the three countries, this exercise will undoubtedly reinforce trilateral military integration.
This is precisely what concerns countries in the region. The US hopes to leverage the exercise to consolidate its alliance system in Northeast Asia; Japan seeks to elevate its own security role through US-Japan-ROK cooperation; and the ROK attempts to strike a balance among maintaining the alliance, addressing the DPRK "threat," and promoting peace on the Peninsula. While the three countries have their respective calculations, if this mechanism continues to develop toward camp-based and bloc-based alignment, it will inevitably raise concerns among neighboring countries.
What the current situation on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia needs most is not more military exercises, greater confrontation, or deeper bloc formation, but for all parties to translate their calls for peace, dialogue, and coexistence into concrete actions. Reducing provocations, resuming communication, managing differences, and advancing the transition from the armistice regime to a peace mechanism are what serve the common interests of countries in the region. If the US, Japan, and the ROK genuinely desire peace on the Peninsula, they should align their actions with their peace rhetoric; otherwise, their so-called peace initiatives will only lose credibility amidst escalating military confrontation.
(The author is director and professor of the Center for Korean Peninsula Studies at the Shanghai University of International Business and Economics)
Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.