By Ding Duo

Divisions within the Philippine government over how to handle its disputes with China in the South China Sea—or the so-called "dispute over policy direction"—are increasingly coming into the open. These divisions show that Manila's South China Sea policy has long strayed from the path of managing tensions and resolving differences, instead taking a misguided course of stoking confrontation in service of domestic politics and even degenerating into a tool for domestic political infighting.

Shared intent, divergent tactics

At present, Philippine government agencies have formed a coordinated system for shaping public perceptions and implementing policy on the South China Sea issue. Their maritime actions are all intended to reinforce the Philippines' illegal claims to certain islands and reefs of China's Nansha Qundao and to Huangyan Dao. The Philippine Coast Guard's "transparency initiative" task force has continued to release edited footage from the scene, portraying its own maritime provocations as efforts to "defend sovereignty" while smearing the China Coast Guard's legitimate rights-protection and law-enforcement activities as "maritime coercion." The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly hyped the illegal arbitral award in the international arena, while the Philippine National Security Council has tightened control over public discourse in the name of combating so-called "Chinese disinformation."

Although they share the same objective, Philippine government agencies differ markedly in how they pursue it, as evidenced most clearly by the public disagreement between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military and coast guard. The Department of Foreign Affairs favors managing maritime differences through diplomatic communication, mindful that the Philippines, as the rotating chair of ASEAN, cannot afford to go "too far" at sea. The Philippine military and coast guard, however, are more inclined to keep tensions high in the South China Sea in pursuit of institutional interests and under the cover of a "security narrative," thereby seeking larger budget allocations and greater political influence. In a domestic climate where "the tougher the stance on China, the more politically correct it is," taking a hard line has itself become a shield against political risk.

Political self-interest drives the hard-line approach

The foreign policy choices of the current Philippine administration have consistently been closely tied to domestic political calculations. Since taking office, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has tethered the country's foreign and security policies to the US while indulging anti-China forces and the military and coast guard as they foment confrontation between China and the Philippines. The purpose is clear: externally, to follow the US closely in exchange for alliance backing and security guarantees; and domestically, to stir nationalist sentiment by hyping the South China Sea issue and divert public attention from economic hardship and livelihood problems. The Philippine President presidential office's tolerance and even encouragement have emboldened the military and coast guard to engage in increasingly brazen adventurism.

The more tense the situation in the South China Sea becomes, the easier it is for Philippine military funding requests to win congressional approval. The Philippines' planned 2027 defense budget is set to increase by another 6.3 percent from the current level, while the proposed allocation for equipment modernization would rise by 25 percent. Over the past year, the Philippine Department of National Defense has advanced the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles and missile-equipped vessels, the Philippine Coast Guard has received patrol vessels from the US, and deliveries of Black Hawk helicopters to the Philippine Air Force have been completed. These moves have strengthened the standing of the Philippine military and coast guard, creating a cycle in which "the tougher the stance, the more funding it receives; and the more funding it receives, the tougher the stance becomes."

To keep this cycle going, the Philippine military and coast guard have continued to mount a supporting publicity campaign. The Philippines' so-called "transparency policy" is, in essence, an attempt to construct a one-sided narrative through selective disclosure. Footage released by the Philippine side invariably depicts the China Coast Guard "enforcing the law aggressively," while omitting how Philippine vessels deliberately approach Chinese vessels and provoke friction. The Philippines' maritime provocations and public-opinion mobilization now operate in tandem: frontline units take actions at sea and the publicity apparatus immediately packages it; media hype about an "escalating threat" then provides cover for further maritime actions.

Support from external powers has also fueled maritime infringements and provocations by the Philippine military and coast guard. The US has tightened its security alignment with the Philippines by expanding joint military exercises, accelerating equipment transfers to the country and seeking to upgrade arrangements under the Visiting Forces Agreement. Japan, Australia and other countries have followed suit, forming a multilateral network of routine defense cooperation. All these moves have served to embolden the Philippine military and coast guard.

The Philippine military and coast guard must be reined in

China and the Philippines are neighbors that cannot move away from each other, and maritime disputes cannot change this basic fact. The Philippines has its own concerns about advancing defense modernization, but tying that effort closely to challenges to China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests is a grave strategic miscalculation. Equipment supplied by external powers and joint military exercises cannot alter the balance of power in the South China Sea, just as hyping the so-called "China threat" cannot resolve the Philippines' domestic development deficit.

China-Philippines relations now stand at a crossroads, and the Philippines side must make a sound and rational choice about the way forward. Allowing the military and coast guard to engage in maritime provocations will only bring greater blowback upon Manila. The Marcos administration's immediate priority should be to rein in the military and coast guard's reckless impulses, stop maritime provocations and manipulation of public opinion, and return to the proper track of bilateral dialogue and consultation.

(The author is director and a research fellow at the Center for the Area Studies of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies)

Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.