By Wang Meng

Against the backdrop of the protracted Ukraine crisis and growing uncertainty over US security commitments to Europe, France's nuclear plan aims to advance European "strategic autonomy" and end Europe's security dependence on the US. It will have far-reaching implications for regional security and stability as well as geopolitical dynamics.

What "forward deterrence" entails

For decades, France's nuclear strategy has been rooted in the Gaullist tradition. Its fundamental principles are maintaining an independent nuclear force, vesting nuclear decision-making authority in the president, and adhering to the principle of "strict sufficiency" (stricte suffisance). The aim is to maintain a nuclear force limited in size but sufficient to inflict "unacceptable damage" on any potential adversary. At its core, the strategy relies on a limited but credible retaliatory capability to safeguard France's vital national interests and strategic autonomy.

Against this backdrop, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech at the Île Longue nuclear submarine base in Brittany on March 2, 2026, where he introduced the concept of "forward deterrence" (dissuasion avancée) for the first time and announced that France would increase the number of nuclear warheads in its arsenal. This marked a shift in France's nuclear strategy from a primary focus on its own territory toward a broader focus on the European continent.

In this sense, "forward deterrence" represents a major adjustment to France's nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War. It marks a shift toward moderate expansion of its nuclear arsenal, forward and mobile deployment, and greater European coordination, with the ultimate aim of establishing a multi-layered deterrence architecture centered on French nuclear forces, supported by European conventional military capabilities and extended through the participation of partner countries.

A partner network taking shape

As of September 2026, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland have become involved in this nuclear initiative to varying degrees.

The United Kingdom plays a foundational role in France's nuclear plan. In July 2025, the two countries signed the Northwood Declaration, stating for the first time that they would coordinate their respective independent nuclear deterrents. The declaration also stated that no "extreme threat" to Europe could affect France or the UK without affecting the other, thereby expanding the role of Franco-British nuclear forces in European security.

Germany, as Europe's largest economy and an important participant in NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements, is a "key partner" in France's efforts to advance "forward deterrence." On March 2, France and Germany issued a joint declaration announcing the establishment of a high-level nuclear steering group to provide an institutional platform for bilateral nuclear strategy dialogue, strategic coordination and crisis consultations.

Sweden, Norway, Poland and Finland constitute important nodes for extending France's "forward deterrence" toward northern and northeastern Europe. These countries have begun moving from strategic dialogue toward coordination on nuclear planning with France. Although the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Greece have also participated in France's "forward deterrence" nuclear initiative, their positions are generally more cautious.

So-called "forward deterrence" risks spiraling out of control

For decades, European nuclear security has rested primarily on US extended deterrence. NATO defines itself as a nuclear alliance, with US nuclear forces stationed in Europe and NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements forming the core pillar of European nuclear deterrence, while the UK and France maintain independent nuclear forces. France's proposed "forward deterrence" is, in essence, an attempt to add another layer of European nuclear deterrence centered on France outside the existing US-European security architecture.

However, the plan also has significant limitations. First, France retains ultimate decision-making authority over the use of nuclear weapons, the formulation of nuclear plans and the definition of its vital interests. Partner countries may participate in dialogue, exercises and crisis consultations, but have no say in nuclear decision-making. Second, France's nuclear forces lag far behind the US nuclear protection system in Europe in terms of force size and global deployment capabilities. Third, European countries do not share the same perception of nuclear security risks. Eastern-flank countries such as Poland and Finland place greater emphasis on directly deterring Russia; Germany would prefer to integrate cooperation with France into the NATO framework; while the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Greece are generally concerned about the potential security and political costs of nuclear deployments. It therefore remains to be seen effective the "forward deterrence" initiative will be.

(The author is an assistant research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies)

Editor's Note: Originally published on china.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.