By Zhang Yongqing

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on September 22 delivered an address during the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly. In her speech, Takaichi repeatedly invoked such rhetoric as the "rule of law," "multilateralism" and a "free and open international order" in an attempt to obscure her real intentions, before going on to make the absurd demand that the "enemy state clauses" in the UN Charter be removed, even elevating the issue to a matter of Japan's "pride and honor." The speech amounted to a diplomatic display of Japan's "neo-militarism," was riddled with internal contradictions, openly challenged the postwar international order, and reflected profound changes in Japan's security strategy in recent years.

In the name of the "rule of law," Takaichi claimed that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion violates the UN Charter, citing the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a typical example. But if the "rule of law" were truly the supreme principle of Japan's foreign policy, Japan's own actions would undoubtedly constitute repeated violations of that principle. The Japanese government has recently been promoting the development of long-range strike capabilities and defense equipment exports, while expanding military cooperation with other countries, yet Takaichi made no mention of any of this in her UN speech. This shows that the "rule of law" emphasized by Japan is nothing more than a double standard—a selective tool serving Japan's strategic interests.

Japan's deliberate misinterpretation of the "enemy state clauses" also deserves attention. The "enemy state clauses" in the UN Charter are an important institutional arrangement intended to prevent fascism and militarism from once again posing a threat to international peace and security, providing an important institutional safeguard for upholding the postwar international order. Today, both the international situation and the direction Japan is taking make this arrangement all the more relevant. By linking the "enemy state clauses" with UN Security Council reform and Japan's international standing, Takaichi is essentially seeking to construct "legitimacy" for a right-wing agenda aimed at freeing Japan from postwar pacifist constraints and expanding its military capabilities. This has never been a question of UN reform, but rather a manifestation of the political ambitions of the Takaichi cabinet.

In addition, Takaichi called in her speech for countries to strengthen their "resilience," incorporating energy, critical minerals, supply chains, the economy and other areas into the framework of an "updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP). On the surface, this is about global supply chain security, but in substance it further intertwines economic, security and geopolitical competition.

A prominent feature of Japan's ongoing systematic strategic shift is that the gradual blurring of the traditional boundaries between military and non-military affairs, security and the economy, and domestic defense and overseas security. Military buildup, alliance cooperation, economic security, technological competition, supply chain restructuring and even the shaping of international rules are all being incorporated into a single national strategy. This strategic shift touches upon are the fundamental principles on which the post-World War II international order was established. The United Nations itself was a product of victory in the war against fascism, while important institutional arrangements for the postwar international order also embody reflection on Japan's history of militarist aggression and constraints against its recurrence. Japan's attempt to continuously break free from these postwar constraints in the name of becoming a "normal country" undoubtedly bears the hallmarks of "neo-militarism" that warrants a high degree of vigilance.

At present, in shaping its external narratives, Japan habitually portrays its strategic expansion as an effort to uphold the international order. A series of policies serving its strategic expansion are uniformly cloaked in the rhetoric of "freedom, openness, the rule of law and multilateralism." This narrative strategy is precisely what is "new" about Japan's "neo-militarism," and is also the aspect of the changes in its security policy that warrants the greatest vigilance.

(The author is a research fellow at the research center for the history of China's northern frontier, Inner Mongolia Normal University)

Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.