By Liu Luechang

Military collusion between Australia and Japan has accelerated recently. From September 8 to 24, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, together with Australia and other countries, conducted the "Orient Shield 26" joint exercise in Hokkaido, Kagoshima and other areas of Japan under the pretext of exercise to advance the forward deployment of strategic offensive weapons. Not long ago, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi visited Australia and held talks with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles, proposing the use of Australian test ranges to support Japan's next-generation long-range strike weapon programs, including hypersonic missiles. The direction of these moves is clear: as Japan accelerates the development of long-range strike capabilities, Australia is becoming an important link in extending the strategic depth of its "southward strategy."

Australia-Japan cooperation serves Japan's military needs. Hypersonic weapons and other long-range missiles require sufficiently large testing space, while Japan's narrow territory and dense population make it difficult to provide ideal conditions for such tests. Australia, with its vast territory and sparse population, has large test ranges such as Woomera Range Comple in the south, naturally making it a prime target for Japan. For Japan, this amounts to extending its limited domestic military space southward.

Over the past few years, Australia has continuously strengthened defense ties with Japan. In August 2023, the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) formally entered into force, providing institutional arrangements for their armed forces to enter each other's territories to conduct exercises and other activities. Now, this cooperation has taken another step toward missile testing. The deeper military cooperation becomes, the more deeply Australian military facilities and territory will be embedded in Japan's long-range strike system, pushing Australia further into geopolitical security risks it could have otherwise avoided.

It is worth noting that, according to foreign media reports, the test range complex that Australia may use covers over 120,000 square kilometers. Long used for weapons testing by Australia and its partners, it also sits on traditional Indigenous land. Over the past decades, disputes have persisted locally over military facility construction, land use and Indigenous rights and interests. If more foreign long-range strike weapons are brought here for testing in the future, addressing issues such as land access, security management, accident liability and the rights and interests of local communities will be far more than just a technical issue. For Canberra, opening up its territory to support other countries in developing more offensive and longer-range weapon systems will come at a very high cost.

Perhaps Australia has its own calculations in this cooperation, but it is playing a poor hand. Australia has already decided to procure Japan's upgraded Mogami-class frigates, and the two countries are advancing cooperation in areas such as laser technology. Australia clearly hopes to leverage this to expand its domestic defense industry and increase its influence in regional security cooperation.

In the short term, these gains are tangible. But the security calculus always looks further ahead than the economic one. In recent years, Japan has continuously expanded its long-range strike capabilities and pressed ahead with building stand-off strike capabilities. If Australia increasingly takes on testing, training and support functions for Japan, its own role in the regional military landscape will change accordingly.

The US factor may also play a role here, but what Australia should ponder more carefully is the boundary of its own interests. If it blindly trusts packaged "security cooperation" and fails to see through the military binding and the essence of Japan's "southward strategy," the risks Australia faces will far outweigh the so-called benefits. Once regional tensions rise, a country undertaking weapons testing, logistical support or even basing functions will find it hard to stay out of the fray.

Therefore, what Australia really needs to weigh carefully is not merely a few arms procurement contracts and technology investments, but how its security environment will change as a result. Japan needs Australia because the latter provides strategic space that Japan's home territory cannot. Does Australia really need such high-risk defense cooperation? Is it prepared to get deeply entangled in another country's military arrangements, or even be used as a springboard?

All cooperation has limits and costs. Turning over more of its territory and military facilities to another country's long-range strike system may yield immediate cooperation dividends, but will entail longer-term and more complex security risks. For Australia, this is a calculation worth making very carefully.

(The author is director and professor at the Institute of Country and Regional Studies, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology)

Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.