By Zhan Debin

Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the US Forces Korea (USFK), recently sparked strong domestic backlash in South Korea after making controversial remarks at an event in the United States. Brunson stated that the conditions for transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea had shifted, necessitating "new standards." The South Korean Ministry of National Defense promptly expressed deep concern, with its spokesperson bluntly stating that if the goalposts keep moving, OPCON can never be transferred.

On the surface, this controversy involves issues of national sovereignty and OPCON transfer, but in essence, it reflects deep-seated contradictions in modernizing the ROK-US alliance: South Korea hopes to leverage alliance modernization to achieve self-reliant defense, while the US seeks to exploit South Korea's drive for defense autonomy to fold it more deeply into its regional strategic posture. Although the two sides seem to be heading in the same direction, their actual strategic objectives are misaligned.

First, South Korea's push for self-reliant defense is fundamentally aimed at reducing its security dependence on the United States. In South Korea's view, building strong self-defense capabilities is the only way to hedge against the threat of US troop withdrawals, curb reliance on US forces, and secure greater national strategic autonomy upon reclaiming OPCON. Consequently, successive progressive administrations in South Korea—from Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in to Lee Jae-myung—have consistently prioritized the OPCON transfer, viewing it as a cornerstone of self-reliant defense.

Now, as the US government pressures allies to shoulder greater defense burdens, South Korea sees an opportune window to advance its self-reliant defense. The Lee Jae-myung administration is actively striving to secure the OPCON transfer by 2028 while seeking advanced military capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines. However, Brunson's recent remarks about shifting transfer conditions underscore a sobering reality: even as South Korea bolsters its self-reliant defense capabilities, whether it can assume operational command according to its "political timeline" remains heavily constrained by US willingness and alliance institutional mechanics.

Second, US support for bolstering South Korea's military capabilities does not translate into a willingness to loosen its strategic grip over South Korea. The US also seeks to modernize the ROK-US alliance, but its calculus is to lighten its own defense burden, prompt South Korea to shoulder broader regional security responsibilities, and preserve or even fortify US strategic clout in Northeast Asia.

In other words, South Korea hopes the US assist in its quest for self-reliant defense, whereas the US expects a stronger South Korean military to take on expanded regional missions. Thus, as the two allies pursue alliance modernization; their shared interests are accompanied by underlying friction.

Lastly and notably, stronger South Korean military capabilities will not automatically translate into greater strategic autonomy.

In fact, self-reliant defense and strategic autonomy are distinct concepts. The former denotes possessing greater capacity for self-defense, whereas the latter entails the freedom to independently decide national strategic orientation, the employment of military forces, and participation in an ally's regional operations.

If South Korea deepens its involvement in US-led regional security initiatives while upgrading its military capabilities, it may acquire more advanced weaponry, but not necessarily greater maneuverability for strategic choices. This creates a potential paradox: the stronger South Korea's self-defense capabilities become, the more justification the US has to demand that South Korea shoulder broader regional strategic duties—thereby heightening the risk of South Korea being dragged into conflicts beyond the Korean Peninsula. Whether South Korea can navigate away from this paradox will not only determine its own national security, but also exert a profound impact on the strategic stability of Northeast Asia.

(The author is a professor and director of the Research Center for the Korean Peninsula at Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, and a visiting researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University)

Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.