By Wang Baokui

NATO's annual nuclear deterrence exercise "Steadfast Noon" kicked off in Italy on October 13, according to reports. Against the backdrop of the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and profound shifts in the European security landscape, this iteration of the exercise reflects NATO's strategic calculus to bolster its nuclear deterrence posture, exerting complex impacts on the regional security environment.

Multinational synergy tests nuclear mission execution

"Steadfast Noon" is NATO's annual nuclear deterrence exercise. Compared with previous iterations, this year's drill exhibits three salient features.

First, participation reached a multi-year high. New Nordic members such as Sweden and Finland have transitioned from "onlookers" to "participants." Reports show that 17 NATO member states—over half of the 32-nation alliance—joined the exercise, deploying about 70 aircraft of various types, including fighters, bombers, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and tankers.

Second, equipment modernization has accelerated. The F-35A fighter jet played the centerpiece role, accelerating the transition of the "nuclear sharing" fleet from legacy platforms like the Tornado aircraft to fifth-generation fighters. Deployed by Italy, the US, and the Netherlands, the F-35A is currently NATO's only fifth-generation fighter with nuclear certification, primarily tasked with simulated nuclear strike missions.

Third, comprehensive support capabilities were further elevated. Spanning five bases across Italy, the exercise featured mixed formations of multinational aircraft, demanding more complex support coordination. Participating forces conducted joint drills along the nuclear mission chain, encompassing simulated alerts, rapid scrambles, ground loading, aerial refueling, and security perimeter defense.

Triggering chain reactions

The impact of this exercise extends far beyond the training itself. The resulting chain reactions are unfolding simultaneously across three dimensions: within the alliance, across Europe, and in global governance.

Deep-seated internal rifts within NATO have come to the fore. Currently, the "US-dominated, Europe-subordinate" nuclear order is being challenged by European strategic autonomy. For instance, France announced its "forward deterrence" doctrine, allowing French nuclear forces to be temporarily deployed on allied territory for the first time; Germany and France formed a nuclear steering group; and Nordic countries like Finland joined French-led nuclear deterrence initiatives. Member states also hold conflicting attitudes toward nuclear missions: France declined to participate this time; Sweden insisted its involvement was limited to "conventional support"; Poland, though willing to assume greater responsibility, denied plans to host nuclear weapons; and efforts in several countries to upgrade nuclear bases or expand nuclear roles face friction from domestic public opinion and political opposition.

NATO and Russia are locking into long-term strategic confrontation. Ahead of the drill, the Russian Embassy in Belgium stated that given NATO views Russia as its primary threat, such exercises do nothing to ease European tensions. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned that nuclear proliferation in Europe is not an abstract threat, but a plausible scenario that could trigger catastrophe. Looking ahead, both NATO and Russia may simultaneously scale up nuclear deployments and readiness, trapping Europe in a "countering nuclear with nuclear" confrontation spiral. Heightened risks of miscalculation and accidental engagement will add fresh volatility to an already fragile security landscape.

The international nuclear non-proliferation regime faces severe strain. As the "nuclear sharing" model replicates and expands, more NATO members are acquiring nuclear mission certifications. The accelerating proliferation of dual-capable combat platforms objectively lowers the threshold for nuclear use. Simultaneously, extended nuclear deterrence efforts, including France's "forward deterrence" doctrine, are embedding conventional assets into the nuclear mission chain and blending conventional and nuclear forces. This blurs the line between nuclear and conventional capabilities, which, compounded by the demise of New START, further erodes the foundations of global strategic stability.

(The author is with the Joint Operations College, PLA National Defense University.)