By Fang Di
The Japan-US joint exercise "Keen Sword 2027", launched on October 19, 2026, cannot be viewed merely as a "routine defense exercise". It sent a dangerous signal that Japan is accelerating its efforts to break free from the constraints of its "exclusively defense-oriented policy ," expand its capabilities of employing military power, deepen the Japan-US military alliance, and advance multilateral security cooperation, seizing the opportunity to cobble together a multilateral security "clique." Particularly, against the backdrop of the Japanese political circle continuously sensationalizing the so-called "Taiwan emergency," this exercise will further aggravate regional military tensions and bring more uncertainty to the regional security situation.
Geographically, Japan is shifting the primary function of its military deployment in the Nansei Islands from monitoring and surveillance to combat operations and forward deployment—a trend, according to neighboring countries, that becomes even more troubling considering Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's previous erroneous remarks that a "Taiwan emergency" could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan . When the situation in the Taiwan Strait is incorporated as a factor underpinning Japan's military deployment and security policy adjustments, relevant measures cease to be simple national defense arrangements and may become practical footholds for intervening in surrounding security affairs, strengthening military deterrence, and even expanding the scope of military operations.
In terms of the participating nations, the joining of the Philippines as well as European countries such as France and Germany reflects Japan's strategic intention to expand its multinational military cooperation network and seek greater regional influence. Among these moves, Japan intends to integrate the Philippines into the overall military deployments around the First Island Chain and attempts to strengthen military ties with NATO member states in the name of "partnership," thereby facilitating external forces' intervention in regional security affairs.
In terms of equipment deployment, through the exercise, Japan aims to enhance integrated operational capabilities ranging from gray-zone scenarios to armed attack situations, demonstrating once again that its military preparation is extending from responding to armed attacks toward broader security contexts with vaguer boundaries.
Given the series of security policy reforms and adjustments by the Japanese government in recent years, neighboring countries cannot help but feel alarmed by its emerging trend of "neo-militarism". History never repeats itself in exactly the same way, but dangerous policies may reappear in new forms. From the Imo Incident in 1882 to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japan’s track record of foreign aggression reveals a path worthy of vigilance: it starts with creating so-called external threats, uses that as an excuse to push for military expansion, then heightens the militarization of crises, till ultimately seeking gains through war. In the early stage of the Meiji Restoration, Japan, while exploring national development, was hesitating between "Anti-foreignism" and "opening the country to the world." The debate on military expansion following the Imo Incident brought operations against the Qing Dynasty into the policy agenda, while Yamagata Aritomo's theory of the "line of interest" extended national security from homeland defense to outward expansion, providing a discursive rationale for military intervention. On the eve of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japan had gradually transformed its military power into a tool for seeking regional dominance, eventually waging a war of aggression. The cautionary takeaway from this chapter of history is that so-called "external threats" can be defined, military expansion can be rationalized, and once a crisis is continuously militarized, the threshold for war will inevitably be lowered.
If we look back on history and examine Japan's current military security policy, we will know that genuine security does not lie in turning so-called "external threats" into pretexts for arms expansion, but in constraining military power based on a clear historical understanding—that’s the only way to avoid plunging us into war again. Only by strictly adhering to peaceful principles can security policy be prevented from veering off its original defensive intent and regional peace and stability be truly maintained.
(The author is from the Beijing Center for Japanese Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University)
Editor's Note: Originally published on chinanews.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.