Japan's nuclear-related probing lays bare its "remilitarization" ambitions

Source
China Military Online
Editor
Li Jiayao
Time
2026-11-06 17:48:27

By Huang Jiayu and Ge Yawei

At a seminar in Tokyo on November 3, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi renewed calls to debate revising the nation's "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" and voiced openness acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, according to Japanese media reports. Reports also revealed that the Japanese government plans to revise the Three Security Documents by the end of this year, potentially incorporating clauses to explore the JSDF's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.

Analysts emphasize that Japan has been steering its security policy in an increasingly offensive, expansionist, and dangerous direction in recent years. Its drive for incremental nuclear unbinding has further exposed its "remilitarization" ambitions to the world. Japan's latest nuclear trial balloon is no impulse move, but a calculated "salami-slicing" maneuver by Japanese right-wing forces to gradually legitimize what was once an untouchable nuclear taboo.

In September 2025, a Japan Ministry of Defense expert panel submitted a report subtly suggesting studies on nuclear-powered submarines. Upon taking office as prime minister, Sanae Takaichi remained evasive about whether to introduce nuclear submarines. In June this year, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai), a coalition partner of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), clamored for the early acquisition of nuclear submarines. In September, Koizumi stated at a press conference that "no options are ruled out" in discussions on revising the Three Security Documents regarding nuclear submarines. By deploying rhetoric like "study" and "discuss," right-wing forces continue to probe international red lines, normalizing an off-limits topic into public discourse to pave the way for eventual debate on nuclear weaponry.

Calculations behind Japan's nuclear submarines ambition run deep. While the JMSDF's Soryu-class and Taigei-class conventional submarines boast impressive acoustic discretion, their endurance is inherently constrained, restricting sustained operations far from home waters. This limitation serves as Japan's immediate technical driver for nuclear propulsion. Possessing superior submerged endurance, nuclear submarines can bypass combat-radius limits to maintain a persistent deep-ocean presence. Japan's deeper strategic calculation is to completely shatter its "exclusively defense-oriented policy"—moving beyond guarding key straits to forging offensive strategic platforms that project power into distant oceans.

Even more alarming is that developing nuclear submarines could hand Japan a shortcut to weaponizing nuclear fuel. Japan holds a stockpile of roughly 44.4 metric tons of separated plutonium—theoretically sufficient for thousands of nuclear warheads. It is also the sole non-nuclear-weapon state possessing a complete nuclear fuel cycle, with capabilities spanning uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing, and nuclear material purification. The naval propulsion technology required for nuclear submarines shares vast overlap with the processing technologies needed to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Analysts stress that beyond technical risks, the greater threat lies in the institutional loophole a nuclear submarine program would create. Currently, Japan's plutonium stockpiles fall within the civilian nuclear fuel cycle and are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, a naval reactor program could carve out a pathway to militarize these stockpiles, enabling a swift transfer from civilian to military inventories and clearing the runway for nuclear breakout.

Pursuing nuclear-powered submarines will trigger severe fallout. First, it deals a crushing blow to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. As a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Japan is also bound by its domestic Atomic Energy Basic Act, which mandates that nuclear energy be used strictly for peaceful purposes. Building naval reactors represents a blatant state-level conversion of nuclear energy toward military expansion, breaching both international and domestic law. For a nation armed with a full fuel cycle, massive plutonium reserves, advanced submarine manufacturing, militarizing nuclear propulsion leaves it just one short step from nuclear weapons. Second, acquiring nuclear submarines goes far beyond updating arsenal inventory—it marks a critical stride in "remilitarization" and dismantling the post-war peace architecture, threatening to push Northeast Asian security into uncharted volatility.

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the Tokyo Trials, yet the judgment of history is far from over. If Japan, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombings, stubbornly pursues nuclear submarines in an attempt to dismantle its "exclusively defense-oriented" shield and erode the bedrock of the post-war order, it will inevitably face the judgment of justice and the reckoning of history once more.

(The authors are with the Chinese PLA Academy of Military Science)

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