By Guo Xiaobing

Japan's nuclear policy recently has shown unusual shifts again. The Takaichi Sanae administration is considering incorporating exceptions to the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" into the National Security Strategy scheduled for revision at the end of the year, potentially permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan under emergency circumstances. The Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi went even further by publicly calling for discussions to adjust the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" and demonstrating a positive attitude toward Japan introducing nuclear-powered submarines. This marks a critical step by Japanese right-wing forces in promoting nuclear unbinding, sounding an alarm for the Northeast Asian security landscape and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

For a long time, Japanese right-wing forces have been dissatisfied with the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," particularly the third principle of "not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons," which they believed weakens the effectiveness of US extended nuclear deterrence for Japan. Now that the Japanese government intends to write the so-called crisis exception into its national security strategy, the three principles will turn into two and a half principles, or even degenerate into a loophole-ridden political fig leaf.

Japanese right-wing forces are well-versed in the strategy of progressive breakthroughs, mapping out a step-by-step, frog-in-boiling-water route.

Step one is to retain the literal phrasing of the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles"—as evidenced by the measures they are currently promoting—while adding an exception clause permitting the entry of nuclear weapons in times of crisis, thereby creating a policy loophole for emergency port calls by US nuclear-armed vessels.

Step two is to re-interpret the definition of "introducing nuclear weapons," excluding port calls and territorial sea transits by US nuclear-armed vessels from the scope of "introduction." This would legitimize visits to Japan by US nuclear-capable vessels during peacetime, aligning with the US rhetoric that the prohibition of introduction merely means prohibiting permanent land deployment of nuclear weapons.

Step three is to completely abolish the principle of "not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons," removing policy obstacles to the entry of foreign nuclear weapons into Japan.

Step four is to further pursue nuclear sharing, seeking the stationing of US nuclear weapons on the Japanese mainland and utilizing Japanese delivery platforms to carry nuclear warheads in wartime, thereby realizing joint operation of nuclear weapons by Japan and the US.

With public opinions and the policy in place, step five is to thoroughly abandon the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" and move toward self-development and possession of nuclear weapons. If the international community doesn't intervene, Japan will follow this path and continue to break through the red lines of nuclear non-proliferation.

Behind this set of dangerous moves lies decades of deliberate political manipulation by Japanese right-wing forces. As early as the 1960s, Japanese right-wing politicians privately admitted that public support for nuclear possession within Japan was insufficient, but the younger generation could be "educated."

Regrettably, the desires of these militarist ghosts have been partially realized. Currently, the Japanese public is obviously less opposed to nuclear unbinding, and right-wing politicians' discussions on nuclear weapons are no longer viewed as a political taboo.

In the face of Japan's dangerous turn in nuclear policy, the international community must devise concrete and effective measures. First, relevant UN agencies should continuously track Japan's policy adjustments as well as its potential for developing and manufacturing nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and make a systematic assessment.

Second, neighboring countries should convey clear signals to Japan, demanding that it strictly abide by the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" and its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and reject any form of progressive nuclear unbinding.

Third, the international community should remain highly vigilant against US-Japan nuclear collusion, preventing the US, which seeks to intensify its deterrence in the so-called Indo-Pacific, from tacitly consenting to or even pushing Japan to breach the post-war nuclear constraints under the guise of "friendly" nuclear proliferation.

(The author is Director of the Center for Arms Control Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations)

Editor's Note: Originally published by huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.