By Lu Hao

The Japanese government has begun considering the inclusion of provisions to strengthen "sustained combat capability" in its National Defense Strategy (NDS), which is scheduled for revision later this year. This phrasing carries significant meaning. While the 2022 edition of the "Three Security Documents"—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the NDS, and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP)—addressed whether Japan "can fight", thereby writing "counterstrike capabilities" into the national strategy, this year’s revision aims to answer whether Japan "can continue fighting and sustain a war of attrition."

For a country that claims an "exclusively defense-oriented policy" to so openly plan for a prolonged war and incorporate it into its national contingency plans demonstrates that Japan's current "remilitarization" has entered a substantive phase, with domestic mobilization and resource preparation for a form of "neo-militarism" being intensively rolled out.

A discussion document regarding the revision of the "Three Security Documents" released by Japan's Ministry of Defense (MoD) in October explicitly states that, to promote a "transformation of defense capabilities," it is imperative to develop the "sustained combat capability" and take comprehensive strengthening actions in the defense industry, equipment technology, military infrastructure, and personnel attrition reduction. This document notes that it is crucial to maintain reserves during peacetime and improve the production expansion system after the outbreak of war. Under this policy, Japan's next steps towards "remilitarization" are becoming increasingly clear.

First, Japan is stockpiling large quantities of ammunition and missiles, with the focus almost inevitably falling on its southwestern direction. The MoD's 2026 White Paper has already identified expanding domestic ammunition production capacity and establishing additional ammunition depots as core tasks; the new NDS merely elevates these priorities to national strategy. It is foreseeable that the reserve of upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles will expand rapidly, multi-year procurement contracts will lock in production line capacity utilization rates, and the ammunition depot network in the southwestern islands of Japan will be further densified. The geographical orientation indicated by these moves is clear.

Even more noteworthy is Japan’s direct entry of state capital to aggressively advance the development of its defense industry. The new "Three Security Documents" are expected to incorporate policies for government investment in the defense sector, potentially involving state ownership stakes in major equipment manufacturing plants. This goes beyond conventional "support", approaching the logic of a wartime-controlled economy: government-guaranteed orders, state control over critical production lines, and the elevation of production capacity at enterprises like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries from "self-production for self-use" to a sustainable, high-intensity level. With the state becoming a shareholder in munitions factories, the concept of a "military-industrial complex" in Japan shifts from mere rhetoric to an institutional arrangement.

This aligns with the calculation of using arms export trade to "feedback" into production capacity and consolidate domestic militarization. The Takaichi administration has further revised the "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology," completely lifting restrictions on lethal weapon exports and vigorously promoting Japanese-made weapons and equipment to "go global" to capture market share in the international defense industry. Driven by the government, Japan's overseas arms export orders are growing rapidly.

We should also be wary of Japan’s comprehensive socio-economic mobilization within the context of strengthening its "sustained combat capability." While "sustained combat capability" focuses on the military domain, the development of "sustained response capabilities" supports this military prowess by covering energy and food supply chains, as well as critical infrastructure such as ports and airports—together forming a top-level design for "total war." Combined with the newly established National Intelligence Bureau in July, the Japan Self-Defense Force Joint Operations Command, as well as the ongoing militarization of public infrastructure and construction of underground shelters in Okinawa, a framework for "long-term war readiness" is taking shape. This framework integrates both military and civilian sectors, connecting peacetime and wartime preparedness.

Meanwhile, U.S.-Japan cooperation in the co-production of Patriot interceptor missiles and the mutual supply of ammunition is bound to expand. Japan aims to serve as an ammunition depot for the U.S. while leveraging this cooperation to make up for its own production capacity shortcomings. The so-called integration within the U.S.-Japan alliance is evolving into a fusion of their military-industrial systems.

As "war preparation" becomes the official language of Japan's strategic documents, the state capital is beginning to take controlling stakes in armaments factories, while food, energy, and ports are all being integrated into the framework of "war response". What remains of the so-called "exclusively defense-oriented policy" is nothing more than an empty sign. History has repeatedly proven that the starting of a war machine often begins not at the moment of a war declaration, but with the question, "What if war breaks out?" For other countries in this region, what truly demands vigilance is Japan's decisive shift toward making "prolonged war preparations" under the guise of "defense."

(The author is director of the comprehensive strategy research office at the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

Editor's Note: Originally published by huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.