By Chen Jingjing

According to Japan's Asahi Shimbun, Japan's Ministry of Defense plans to establish a dedicated unit within its Defense Policy Bureau to deal with so-called "cognitive warfare." The unit's main responsibilities will include assessing and rebutting information on social media and determining the level and timing of public responses. Of particular concern, the unit will "swiftly refute" content involving Japan's "neo-militarism."

The move follows the policy direction of strengthening external communication capabilities since Shinjiro Koizumi took office as defense minister, revealing yet another attempt by Japan's right-wing forces to go on the offensive under the guise of "defense" and proactively wage a battle for public opinion. The core purpose of Japan's move is to manipulate public opinion at home and clear the way for loosening military restrictions, while misleading the international community and providing cover for military expansion abroad.

Domestically, since the end of World War II, Japan's military development has long been constrained by its pacifist Constitution, while military expansion and constitutional revision have lacked sufficient public support. Japan's right-wing forces have therefore long faced a thorny question: How can they persuade a public accustomed to peaceful development to accept the country's remilitarization?

The planned "cognitive warfare" unit is precisely a key tool through which the right wing seeks to break this impasse. One of its core functions is to routinely hype up security threats from neighboring countries and deliberately stoke a sense of crisis and anxiety among the public. By systematically magnifying so-called "external risks," it seeks to keep the public immersed in a manufactured "threat narrative," gradually weakening anti-war sentiment and reducing public resistance to breaching the "exclusively defense-oriented" principle.

The logic behind this approach is essentially the same as the tactics used by Japan's military authorities before World War II to manipulate public sentiment through intelligence and propaganda systems: first manufacture fear, then pursue military expansion in the name of "security," and ultimately drag the country onto the path of war. More alarming still, the unit is not, as claimed by the Japanese side, merely designed to "passively respond to misinformation." Rather, it is intended to actively shape narratives and guide public opinion, directly serving the practical needs of a shift in Japan's defense policy.

Externally, Japan's planned unit is primarily intended to muddy the waters and provide cover for military expansion. Japanese media have openly stated that one of its key tasks is to swiftly refute claims by countries such as China that Japan is pursuing "neo-militarism," in an attempt to prevent such views from spreading in international public opinion. This wording itself betrays Japan's unease over its accelerating remilitarization in recent years, including moves to revise the Constitution and expand the military, continuously raise defense spending, lift the ban on the right of collective self-defense, and develop long-range strike capabilities.

Interpretations, criticism, and concerns in the international community regarding Japan's "neo-militarism" are grounded in historical facts and well-documented developments. Instead of reflecting on its own conduct, Japan seeks to distort these voices as "deliberate smears" and "public opinion attacks" under the banner of "cognitive warfare."

In fact, it is Japan itself that is investing heavily in cognitive warfare and systematically using disinformation to smear and attack other countries. Over the past decade or more, Japan's cognitive warfare against China has gradually developed into a system: first, establishing dedicated funds and elevating cognitive warfare to the level of state action; second, using crowd sourcing platforms to build an industrialized "lie production" assembly line; and third, using artificial intelligence to distort history and mass-produce false content.

By funding overseas think tanks, steering international media, exporting one-sided narratives, and smearing neighboring countries, this system interferes with the international community's objective understanding of the geopolitical landscape and historical issues in East Asia. On the one hand, Japan portrays itself as a so-called "victim" and "guardian of order"; on the other, it quietly expands its intelligence capabilities, upgrades its military strength, and builds capabilities for overseas military operations, thereby seeking to evade external scrutiny of its militarization. This information warfare strategy of "using offense as defense" bears a striking resemblance to the propaganda tactics routinely employed by militarists in the past.

At a deeper level, Japan's plan to establish a so-called "cognitive warfare" unit is, in essence, an attempt to launch a "neo-militarist cognitive warfare" campaign, which itself offers the latest evidence that Japan is rapidly sliding toward militarism.

Unlike the overt mode of traditional military expansion, this form of warfare, centered on cognitive infiltration and manipulation of public opinion, is more covert and deceptive. Rather than immediately baring the bayonet, it seeks to undermine opponents ideologically and shape Japan's own image, clearing away obstacles to military expansion.

Yet the real-world harm caused by such covert means is concrete and visible: they can distort countries' perceptions of the security situation in East Asia, deliberately sow suspicion and confrontation among regional countries, and seriously erode the hard-won foundation of mutual trust. If Japan uses this approach to further develop offensive military capabilities, it will directly aggravate regional tensions and seriously undermine peace and stability in the region.

(The author is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS)

Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.