Recently, it was reported that Dr. James H. Anderson, US PTDO Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said that if the United States approves the principle of no first use (NFU), the risk of nuclear conflicts will increase accordingly. Such remarks show that the US side deliberately turns a deaf ear to the objective benefits of the no-first-use policy and only considers its own security based on unilateralism ideas.

The no-first-use principle is a positive concept in nuclear control that can reduce nuclear risk.

The connotation of the principle is that a nuclear power pledges not to use nuclear weapons as a means of warfare in crisis or wartime unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons.

The no-first-use policy is a positive value in nuclear control worth getting promoted and popularized. It correctly understands and views the relative role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy. With the implementation of the no-first-use strategy, neither side will resort to nuclear weapons first, and thus will not cause uncontrollable consequences from nuclear conflicts. This is a nuclear strategy aiming at preventing and reducing the risk of nuclear wars.

On the very first day when China possessed nuclear weapons, it declared the no-first-use policy and has since adhered to it. China's nuclear policy demonstrates the country's role in maintaining strategic stability and sets a positive example for the international community. If the policy can be obeyed by all nuclear weapon states, it is bound to deliver a positive impact on establishing a strategically stable relationship among those countries and contribute to a reasonable and well-organized global nuclear order.

Besides China, India also pursues the no-first-use nuclear policy and primarily intends to deter Pakistan. In the face of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, India would use the no-first-use strategy as a deterrent to ensure that Pakistan does not dare to use nuclear weapons first in crisis or wartime, while India can gain an advantage by relying on its conventional military power.

During his presidency, Barrack Obama said that the United States may announce the implementation of the no-first-use nuclear strategy, a positive action related to nuclear weapons that was once well-received in the international community. However, the strategy was completely abandoned when Donald Trump took office.

The US is seemingly avoiding no first use and actually seeking access to nuclear weapons whenever it wants.

The reason why the United States proposed that the no-first-use strategy would increase the risk of nuclear conflicts is that accepting such principle will prevent the United States from using nuclear weapons first when its own or allies' major interests get damaged. And this will serve to increase the risk of using nuclear weapons instead.

This reason can be understood like this: if the United States implements the no-first-use strategy, then it will not respond first with nuclear weapons when the opponent attacks the United States and its allies. This will induce the opponent to use nuclear weapons first to attack the United States, and with the counterattack from the United States, a nuclear war occurs. To be specific, the reason may include three implied meanings.

First, the United States firmly believes that its opponent who sets to damage its own and its allies' interests, is likely to resort to nuclear weapons first. In the eyes of the United States, its identified opponent country is willing to actively use nuclear weapons first, while indifferent to the United States' nuclear counterattack capabilities. Thus, the US side is worried that the no-first-use principle will induce its opponent country to prefer to use nuclear weapons first.

Second, even if the opponent does not use nuclear weapons, the US adoption of the no-first-use strategy is but to indirectly encourage the opponent to take advantage of conventional military power in some localities, causing damage to the United States or its allies. According to this thinking, if the United States adopts a no-first-use nuclear strategy, which means it fails to provide nuclear umbrella for its allies in Asia and Europe, resources of the US and its allies in those areas will get damaged by superior conventional military power of China and Russia.

In addition, the United States believes that since no-first-use principle will lead to the risk of nuclear conflicts, it is necessary to maintaining the stance of using nuclear weapons at any time or even preemptively using them, to deter the so-called strategic opponents from using nuclear weapons and superior conventional military power.

All the above-mentioned three meanings just reflect the United States' assumptions about security threats from other countries, especially the so-called strategic adversaries. The United States has always subjectively determined the hostility of its opponents. If a country poses a challenge to the great power's hegemonic position and benefits that comes along, the United States often judges it as an opponent, believing that the country is a threat to the United States and intends to harm the US anytime and anywhere, though the country’s input in national development and its overall national strength growth do not aim at competing with the United States for hegemony. If the country develops military power on account of its own national defense and security needs and is regarded as an adversary by the United States, its development of national defense capabilities is to be labeled as a threat on the US side.

This is a typical strategic victimhood left over from the Cold War. The United States is still upholding the Cold War and victimhood mentality for the other countries' improvement of comprehensive national and military strength, and thus adopts an unhealthy self-defense mechanism that superficially responds to threats to the United States while actually destabilizes great powers’ relationships and undermines global stability. The emphasis on the preemptive and handy use of nuclear weapons, and lowering the nuclear threshold to enhance actual combat capabilities with nuclear weapons, are the manifestations of this unhealthy mechanism.

(The author is a postdoctoral fellow in the School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, who specializes in arms control and national security)

Disclaimer: This article is originally published on thepaper.cn and translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information, ideas or opinions appearing in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.