By Da Zhigang
Since taking office, Biden has made no secrete of his intention of strengthening international coordination and tightening the ties with allies. When discussing how Washington will appeal to its Asian allies, particularly Tokyo and Seoul, some Japanese scholar said compared with his immediate predecessor who only talked about money, the Biden administration is likely to resort to “reminiscence” to get Japan and ROK to start dialogue and cooperation soon, so that it can re-engage in regional affairs.
The Japan-ROK relation has been an old headache that all US presidents must face squarely. Obama administration hoped for the US-Japan-ROK relation to serve its“Asia Pacific rebalancing” strategy, but bilateral relation between those two had fallen below the freezing point due to historical grievances as well as realistic conflicts.
Obama tried every means to get Japan and ROK to sign the agreement on comfort women and theGeneral Security of Military Information Agreement(GSOMIA), which, however, soon turned into new fuses of bilateral disputes during Trumps’ term and sparked new flashpoints such as the ROK-initiated lawsuit against Japan over forced labor in wartime and Japan’s trade regulation against ROK.
Not only did Trump rip off his allies by demanding Tokyo and Seoul to bear a much larger share of the military expenses for American troops stationed in them, but he also treated them differently by playing up Japan while playing down ROK. As a result, Japan and ROK have been falling increasingly apart and the trilateral alliance is all but collapsed.
Now that Biden is at the White House for a month, the Oval Office has a stronger desire for Japan and ROK to put their grudges aside and work together to serve America’s Northeast Asian and Indo-Pacific strategy. Will its “match-making” fraught with American values and reminiscence work? Will it be respected by the two countries as a mediator? Ambitious and eager as Biden is, his reconciliatory attempt may be snubbed.
There are three reasons. First, the historical grievances and current conflicts between Japan and ROK cannot be easily resolved through foreign intervention. Being close neighbors, the two countries have a feud that goes too far and too deep, involving perception of history, territorial sovereignty, national sentiments, state image, and public dignity. Although these issues may be kept under control or even mitigated for a moment under America’s mediation, they are mostly just shelved while an effective solution for the medium and long term has never been found. Even if Biden’s “reminiscence” works for a while, it’s just turning a smoking bomb into a time bomb without taking off the fuse once and for all.
Second, the Biden administration is also treating Japan and ROK differently, either consciously or unconsciously. In the past month and more, the new administration has gradually unfolded its policy toward the two countries as well as for coordinating the trilateral relation. But while trying to give Japan new excitements and ROK new expectations, the White House has intentionally or unintentionally demonstrated a different attitude toward the two, as evidenced by the timing of president Biden’s phone talk with Japanese and ROK leaders, the different statement about Japan and ROK’s position in America’s Northeast Asia and Indo-Pacific strategy, and the announcement that all three countries need to work together for a resolution of the Korean peninsular issue. This has eased Japan’s worries but made ROK anxious and vigilant. In ROK’s opinion, the US is being partial, which will very likely backfire and send Biden’s “reminiscence card” back to square one.
Third, it’s impossible for Japan and ROK to give up ideological confrontation and geopolitical competition. Historical grievances and realistic conflicts aside, the two countries have long viewed each other as geopolitical competitors, potential economic and trade contenders, and rivals in cooperation with the US. Such ideologies and thinking have exerted negative effects when both countries take part in international coordination, ally consultation, bilateral or multilateral collaboration. In particular, both Tokyo and Seoul have their own calculations regarding the US Indo-Pacific strategy in recent years, so it’s impossible for them to just bury the hatchet because of America’s reminiscent coaxing.
Compared with Trump’s “money talk” that put the US-Japan-ROK alliance on thin ice, Biden’s “reminiscent talk” may temporarily reconcile the two Northeast Asian countries, but values and reminiscence alone cannot bring about a historic make-peace.
(The author is director and researcher at the Institute of Northeast Asian Studies, Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences.)
