By Wu Huaizhong

In June, the Japanese government decided to revise its National Security Strategy formulated in 2013. It is reported that the Japanese National Security Council (NSC) will discuss three key areas - new missile defense approach, economic security, and post-pandemic international rules - and try to complete the revision within the year. The new strategy integrates diplomatic, security, and economic sectors and smacks of a national strategy or big strategy.

Two policy directions are worth attention.

Given the complicated international situation nowadays, Japan’s latest move may lead to significant consequences. Given a series of developments, the planned revision reveals two policies tendencies - the normalization of military security and transition to attack, and turning economic security into a political and strategic matter, which are worth special attention.  

First of all, in terms of military security, the new strategy intends to lift certain restrictions and turn them into explicit policies to break Japan’s state policy of “limitation to self-defense”. Taking the stoppage of the deployment of the land-based Aegis Combat System, the Abe administration is considering developing the capability to attack enemy bases. As to economic security, the fact that the new strategy intends to turn economic and trade affairs into strategic, political, and security matters is worth attention.  

Of course, these are just possible directions of the new strategic adjustment, and the final result still depends on the game of multiple political forces. Voices of doubts within Japan seem to have already answered the question as to whether these adjustments are likely to ensure Japan’s national security. For instance, both the ruling party and the opposition party expressed concern over the Abe administration’s circumvention of the Peace Constitution and the “self-defense-only” policy. They believed such a move would definitely stimulate an arms race, worsen regional security situation, and impose severe security risks and challenges on Japan. Meanwhile, many studies conducted by Japan also indicate that the over-politicization of economic subjects against economic laws and enforced decoupling and de-sinicization is neither plausible nor beneficial for the country.

Strayed policy on China implies risks.

The neighboring countries don’t have to put themselves in Japan’s strategic adjustment, but the message of “ally itself with the U.S. to contain China” released by the adjustment cannot be overlooked. The fact that the Abe administration revised the security strategy in advance is in itself regarded as targeting China. The draft of Defense of Japan 2020 (Annual White Paper) unveiled in May claimed to pay close attention to the China-pushed “order building” and “national competition” in the security field. Moreover, the Japan-US interactions or Japan following the lead of the US became more evident during the strategic adjustment. June 23 marked the 60th anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, when the Nikkei Business Daily reported that the China-targeting strategy revision would be conducted in consultation with the US and given the Japan-US security system and discussions of economic security measures will be made, including preventing the outflow of advanced technologies.  

The overarching guideline of “ally itself with the U.S. against China” determines that Japan’s strategic adjustment this time will unavoidably affect its relations with China, which partly explains the recent subtle changes in Abe’s attitude toward China. Around the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, Tokyo has been quite cautious in dealing with Beijing to maintain the positive momentum in bilateral ties since 2017. Yet Japan’s China policy began to go astray since May, when global cooperation was most needed to battle the COVID-19 jointly, and the country has been taking provocative moves ever since.

We want to believe that Tokyo has been forced to take this path. After all, the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically re-defined the scope and significance of national security. Japan isn’t the only country that’s rethinking the globalization and supply chain security and making corresponding adjustments, nor is it alone in having to carefully balance the distance from the US and China and changing its attitude toward China because of pressure from the US. Its actions haven’t slid below the bottom line of China-Japan relations yet, and China is willing to accommodate its concerns and difficulties.

But the recent series of events also indicate that Japan indeed plans to dramatically adjust its strategy, about which we should be concerned and worried. It has pushed overtly or covertly for security confrontation, military deterrence, economic decoupling, and obstruction against China, and its words and deeds concerning Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Diaoyu Islands dispute have been outrageously aggressive. It seems Japan is heading in the wrong direction based on a misjudgment of the changes in the international landscape and the “post-pandemic” situation. Tokyo seems to want to join the US’ geopolitical competition and confrontation with China by adjusting the course of its China policy. If this is a strategic scheme and transition, it contains underlying severe risks and may slide out of the reasonable range of China-Japan relationship.

Vision should prevail over vexation and vacillation

The Japanese strategists and elites both believe that the country’s top external priority is the “China issue”. In the past few years, the Abe administration has been on the right track of developing bilateral ties, which complies with the spirit of Japan-China coordination and the “eternal neighbors” principle proposed by Abe.

Such a sound development of bilateral relations is guided by the “ten-point consensus” reached by the two countries in 2019, which is, in fact, the best option for Japan to achieve “military security” and “economic security”. Their collective efforts to build a bilateral relationship in the new era have been a rare highlight in the international community over recent years amid the deteriorated geopolitics and the escalated major-country game. In this process, Abe’s efforts for “strategic independence” and diplomatic balance adapted to the changes in the international landscape and facilitate Japan with more opportunities to have its place as a major-country in the world.

When China and Japan resumed diplomatic relationship, a hard lesson for Japan was that it shouldn’t blindly follow the US and let Washington control its China policy. Tokyo should realize the global changes and the new reality in Asia, and learn to balance and grip these unprecedented complexities. Unlike western countries who are dealing with the “mammoth” China for the first time, Japan should have learned how to get along with China in their long history of interactions and should have more vision, calmness, and confidence. Yet what it displays now is excessive anxiety, irresolution, and combativeness, which is truly regrettable.

(The author is deputy director and researcher with the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)