By Sun Chenghao
The US and EU have had frequent interactions recently, with US President Biden joining a video conference of 27 EU leaders and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visiting Europe and meeting NATO and EU leaders. These moves indicate America’s eagerness to engage with Europe, mend their ties and reinvent the transatlantic alliance.
However, the damage of Trump years to the transatlantic relationship is just hard to repair. Both Washington and Brussels have realized an eroding consensus within the alliance and the irreversible fact of Europe’s strategic independence. Biden hoped Europe would follow his lead and adjust its foreign policy. Still, German counselor Merkel said the EU would continue to implement the thought of “European sovereignty” and that the EU and the US have common ground but are not on the same page on everything.
In fact, Washington’s changed Europe policy is just an expedient to maintain its hegemony rather than a long-term strategy to promote their alliance. The White House has three considerations and goals in mind.
First, it is bridging the gap across the Atlantic Ocean caused by the “Trump shock wave” and recalibrating the US-EU alliance. As Europe is seeking “strategic independence”, the US worries that the traditional balance of power is tipped and restricts America’s development in return. In that case, a competitive relationship between the two sides would make it more costly for Washington to manage its allies.
Second, it is reshaping America’s leadership in the West. Biden emphasized that the aim of America’s diplomacy is to consolidate national credibility, and he vowed to revitalize democratic values, including promising to convene a Summit for Democracy. Under the new circumstances, the US and the EU may join hands in promoting western democratic values on new topics and fronts, and take that as the highlight in their efforts to unite with the West, strengthen cooperation and reinforce the alliance, so as to establish the so-called international order of democracy jointly.
Third, it is trying to secure more discourse power on global affairs. The US and the EU are likely to cooperate more on the Iranian nuclear issue and climate change, and “US-EU international rule-making” will be one of the top priorities of the next phase of the transatlantic relationship. They may work to roll out new international standards and regulations on technology and trade.
Although the US is trying hard to rebuild the alliance across the Atlantic Ocean, patching things up with the EU is easier said than done due to a slew of challenges.
For one thing, behind the US-EU value consensus is the conflict between America’s geopolitical perspective and EU’s economy-dominant stance. In the post-Trump period, the US remains a strong force against globalization and liberalism, whereas Europe is inclined to promote a global policy that serves its interest.
For another, the US is shifting its strategic resources to the Asian-Pacific region and no longer takes Europe as the priority in its foreign strategy. Given America’s weakening national strength and poor policy consistency, its economic and military input into the US-EU alliance will hardly meet the latter’s strategic needs, and Europe, in turn, will not be at America’s beck and call, nor will it give up the chance to consolidate internal solidarity and strength.
At last, America’s attempt to drag Europe into the “major-country rivalry” goes counter to Europe’s desire for economic development. Washington wants Europe to be its assistant in the “major-country competition”. It has pressured Europe many times on the “Nord Stream 2” natural gas pipeline project, a cooperation project with Russia, regardless of European countries’ demand for energy cooperation with Moscow. Washington’s high-handed approach with Europe has only made things worse.
Although the US wishes to improve the alliance with Europe, their divergences on global governance, regional security, and economic cooperation will not go away. If Uncle Sam is determined to cling to the Cold War mentality, push bloc confrontation – what it calls “major-country competition” today – by manufacturing an external enemy and view Europe as an assistant to serve its strategy, the US-EU alliance is bound to split or even collapse.
(The author is from the Institute of American Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.)