By Zi Ge

子  歌

A soldier assigned to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) participates in airdrop exercise at East Fuji Maneuver Area .

日本陆上自卫队队员在东富士训练场参加空降演习。

The ROK Defense Ministry agreed that JSDF could enter the ROK in wartime to deliver supplies to the US Forces Korea (USFK), Japanese media reported on October 9th. This decision in a way indicated the mitigation of the military estrangement between Japan and the ROK, and marked a step forward in the US-led trilateral military cooperation.

据日本媒体10月9日报道，韩国国防部已同意允许日本自卫队在战时为驻韩美军运送物资而临时进入韩国。这一决策一定程度上标志着日韩之间军事隔阂的缓和，也表明由美国主导的美日韩三边军事合作向前推进一步。

The ROK Constitution stipulates that the National Assembly has the right to declare war, send troops overseas, and authorize the stay of foreign troops in the country. But the ROK Defense Ministry recently explained that JSDM's temporary entry into USFK bases doesn't fall under the category of the Constitution-defined "short stay", so it doesn't need approval from the National Assembly. This means the USFK can invite JSDF to the Korean Peninsula as needed.

Japan and the ROK have been pushed by the Biden administration towards a so-called "reconciliation" in recent years, with their diplomatic interactions increasing especially after the trilateral summit at Camp David in August 2023, and their contacts in the military sector becoming more frequent too. 

In December 2023, they separately achieved interconnectivity with USFJ and USFK's radar command and control system, enabling them to share missile early warning intelligence in a real-time manner. In June this year, the three countries' Coast Guard agencies had their first joint maritime exercise in the Sea of Japan; at the end of June, the three countries had their first joint military exercise, the "Freedom Edge" in the open sea south of the Jeju Island, covering multiple domains including the sea, the airspace, and the cyberspace. In July, the three defense ministers signed the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF) and decided that the three countries would take turns hosting their regular defense ministers' meeting, chiefs of staff meeting, security meeting, and other high-level meetings. 

According to analysts, the recent ease of tension and increased military interactions between Japan and the ROK doesn't mean they can be forced into an alliance by the US in the near future, because the Japan-ROK relations are subject to the influence of multiple factors.

近年来，在美国拜登政府推动下，日韩关系开始走向所谓的“和解”。特别是在2023年8月的美日韩戴维营首脑峰会后，日韩在外交层面的互动增加。在军事领域，双方展现出互动节奏加快、事务层面对接密集等特点。2023年12月，通过美国印太司令部的协调，日韩分别实现日本自卫队与驻日美军雷达指挥控制系统、韩国军队与驻韩美军雷达指挥控制系统的互联互通，意味着三国可实时共享导弹预警情报；今年6月，美日韩海警机构首次在日本海举行海上联合演练；6月底，美日韩首次在济州岛以南公海举行名为“自由之刃”的联合军演，涵盖海域、空域、网络等多个领域；7月，美日韩三国防长签署“美日韩安全合作框架协议”，并决定美日韩将定期轮流举行防长会议、总参谋长会议、安全会议等高级别会议。分析人士指出，近期日韩关系缓和且军事互动增加，并不代表两国能在短期内被美国“捏”成盟友。这是因为，日韩关系的波动受到多个因素影响。

From America's perspective, the Biden administration has been pushing the so-called "integrated deterrence" strategy  and trying to combine the US-Japan alliance and US-ROK alliance into a trilateral system to facilitate the integration and dispatching of military resources in northeast Asia. Yet given the historical grudge and territorial disputes between Japan and the ROK, there is no basis of mutual trust to forge an alliance between them, and the temporary improvement of relations now is mainly prompted by America's magnification of their security concerns. As the US is about to elect a new president, whether the next administration will maintain the current diplomatic push is to be seen.

从美国角度看，拜登政府自上台以来，持续推动所谓的“联盟威慑”战略，试图在东亚地区将美日同盟、美韩同盟升级为美日韩三边同盟，以便整合和调动东北亚的军事资源。但鉴于日韩之间长期存在历史问题和领土纷争，两国不具备建立同盟的互信基础，现阶段关系的改善，主要是受到美国持续放大两国安全焦虑的影响。随着美国大选进入倒计时，未来新一届政府能否维持现有的外交推动力度，还需进一步观察。

From the ROK's perspective, where the Korean Peninsula is heading is very important, and Seoul is trying to augment the deterrence against the DPRK by intensifying its military cooperation with the US and Japan. But its decision to let JSDF enter the ROK under certain circumstances has already drawn extensive protests and objections within the country, mirroring the ROK public's deep-rooted dissatisfaction with and doubt of Japan.

从韩国角度看，半岛的和平态势走向至关重要。韩国试图通过加强与美日军事合作，增强对朝鲜的威慑能力。然而，允许日本自卫队在特定条件下进入韩国的决定，已在韩国国内引发大量抗议和反对声，反映出韩国社会对日本仍有深刻不满和猜疑。

From Japan's perspective, taking the initiative to meddle in regional hotspot issues is its old trick of breaking the limitations on its military capacity. In recent years, Japan has repeatedly exaggerated regional security threats including the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, and has developed, in steps, the ability to attack enemy missile bases preemptively. Meanwhile, it has kept strengthening military collusion with foreign militaries within the US-led security framework, and driven the JSDF to routinely perform overseas military missions in an ever wider scope. 

从日本角度看，主动介入地区热点问题，是其突破自身军事能力限制的惯用手段。近年来，日本多次渲染朝核等地区安全威胁，分步构建可先发制人打击敌方导弹基地的能力。同时，日本在美国主导的安全框架内持续加强对外军事勾连，推动自卫队常态化执行海外军事行动，并不断扩大军事行动的范围。

The Japan-ROK relations are also affected by the Asian Pacific security situation. That each of them has its own calculations makes a thorough "reconciliation" almost impossible, both from a historical and realistic point of view, limiting the depth and breadth of their military cooperation. 

此外，日韩关系还受到亚太地区安全局势等因素的影响。总体来看，日本和韩国各有盘算，其彻底“和解”的历史和现实基础仍然相当脆弱，这在客观上限制了两国军事合作的深度与广度。