By Zhao Long
赵隆
Upon concluding a whirlwind visit to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Russian President Vladimir Putin received the visiting Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Moscow on December 7. From the intensive diplomatic agenda of the Russian leader, it can be seen that in the context of the ongoing protracted Ukraine crisis and the complex evolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Russia is taking the initiative to increase focus and engagement in the Middle East agenda in a bid to take it as a key option for its diplomatic breakthrough. Specifically, Russia's diplomatic thrust in the Middle East has multiple objectives.
刚刚完成对阿联酋和沙特“旋风式”工作访问的俄罗斯总统普京，7日又在莫斯科接待了来访的伊朗总统莱希。从俄领导人密集的外交日程可以看出，在乌克兰危机持续延宕和巴以冲突复杂演变的背景下，俄罗斯正主动加大对中东议程的关注和介入，尝试将其作为“外交突围”的关键选项。具体来看，俄罗斯的中东“外交攻势”具有多重目标。
First, to send political signals. Since the sudden intensification of the Ukraine crisis in 2022, it had become an important means for the US and Europe to show their political standpoints by isolating Russia on all diplomatic fronts and restricting its participation in multilateral occasions using techniques such as declining attending invitations and exiting midway. The probability of rapidly restoring the frequency and scope of head-of-state diplomacy has become an important indicator for Russia to demonstrate strategic confidence, break Western isolation and return to the international stage.
首先是释放政治信号。2022年乌克兰危机骤然加剧以来，在外交上全面孤立俄罗斯，通过拒绝出席、中途离场等方式在多边场合限制俄罗斯参与，成为美欧展现政治立场的重要手段。能否尽快恢复元首外交的频次和范围，成为俄对外展示战略自信、打破西方孤立和重返国际舞台的重要指标。
The choice of time and targets of Putin's visit reflects that Russia is tentatively ramping up its diplomatic breakthrough efforts. Putin's first visit to the UAE coincided with the departure of Western leaders, when the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was held. Combined with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's first participation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Ministerial Council meeting since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and his simultaneous presence with representatives of many European countries, it can be seen that Russia hopes to demonstrate its confidence in managing an extended crisis with Ukraine by way of diplomatic breakthrough.
普京此访的时间节点和对象选择，表明俄罗斯正在试探性地加大“外交突围”力度。首站阿联酋正举办《联合国气候变化框架公约》第二十八次缔约方大会，普京在西方国家领导人刚刚离开之际到访。结合不久前俄外长拉夫罗夫自俄乌冲突爆发以来首次参加欧安组织成员国外长会议、与欧洲多国代表同台亮相的举动，可以看到俄希望利用外交层面的突破，展示应对乌克兰危机长期化的自信。
Second, to reinforce the economic lifeline. Since the beginning of 2023, the US and European countries have switched from a unilateral ban to a multilateral price limit and embargo on Russian energies, which had once recovered the global energy prices to the pre-conflict level and battered Russia's ability to achieve economic self-sustainment through energy premiums. The way to find the common interests with major Middle East oil producing countries by using the "OPEC+" mechanism and to stabilize oil prices through joint production reduction has been regarded as one of the primary goals for Russia to respond to sanctions, and Saudi Arabia also serves as the key to sustaining the production cuts. Further strengthening the UAE's position as the largest trading country and investment partner of Russia in the Middle East has become an important part of Putin's Middle East diplomatic plan.
其次是稳固经济命脉。今年以来，美欧对俄罗斯能源从单方“禁购”走向多方“限价”和“禁运”，一度导致全球能源价格回归冲突爆发前的水平，俄通过能源溢价实现经济“自我造血”的能力也遭受重大打击。因此，如何利用“欧佩克+”机制与中东主要产油大国找到利益契合点，通过联合减产稳住石油价格，成为俄罗斯应对制裁的首要目标之一，而沙特也是减产措施能否持续的关键。进一步强化阿联酋作为俄最大中东贸易国和投资伙伴地位，自然成为普京谋划中东外交的重要内容。
Russia hopes to maintain cohesion on the voluntary production cut issue with Saudi Arabia through the head-of-state diplomacy, to foster collective actions within the "OPEC+" mechanism to tackle the declining oil prices. Russia also deepens investment and technical cooperation with the UAE to maintain its comparative advantages on the battlefield by reinforcing both energy incomes and foreign investment, the two main economic lifelines.
俄希望通过元首外交与沙特在自愿减产问题上保持步伐一致，推动“欧佩克+”机制针对油价下行进一步采取集体行动，并深化与阿联酋的投资和技术合作，通过稳固能源收入和外资这两大经济命脉维持在战场上的比较优势。
Third, to seek strategic hedging. The Palestinian-Israeli issue ran through Putin's trip to the Middle East and was also the focus of his meeting with the head of Iran. In fact, when the Palestinian-Israeli conflict began to escalate, Russia had repeatedly called on all relevant parties to abide by the two-state solution on the basis of UN resolutions, and Putin had also expressed intention to mediate between them but received no direct response. This face-to-face engagement with the leaders of major Middle East countries will not only help coordinate standpoints and interest claims, but also strengthen Russia's role as a main external player in the political and security agendas of the Middle East.
再次是寻求战略对冲。巴以问题贯穿普京的中东之行，也是俄伊元首会晤的重点议题。实际上，俄罗斯在巴以冲突升级之初就多次呼吁各方遵守基于联合国决议的“两国方案”，普京也表示有意从中斡旋，但并未得到直接回应。这次与中东主要国家领导人进行面对面接触，不但有助于协调立场和利益诉求，还可强化俄罗斯作为中东政治和安全议程的主要“外部参与者”地位。
More importantly, seizing the opportunity of mediating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to strengthen interactions with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both being important allies of the US, could demonstrate Russia's distinct sway over them and be treated as a vital instrument to curb the US agenda in the Middle East. Increasing involvement in the Middle East issue can also form the second front of Russia-US strategic gaming, increasing the dispersion of resources dedicated to supporting Ukraine by the US and achieving strategic hedging.
更重要的是，阿联酋和沙特均为美国在中东地区的重要盟友，以斡旋巴以冲突为契机强化与两国的互动，可以展现俄对相关国家的特殊影响力，将此作为牵制美国中东议程的重要抓手。增加对中东议题的介入程度，也可成为俄罗斯对美战略博弈的“第二战线”，扩大美在援乌问题上的资源配置分流并实现战略对冲。
Last, to push the diversion of focus. The Russian elites generally believe that even if Russia and Ukraine could attain a ceasefire or resume negotiations to halt this round of crisis, the Western countries will not completely lift sanctions or fundamentally change the containment against Russia. Therefore, Russia needs to accelerate the eastward geopolitical strategy. But from a practical point of view, this strategic shift, based on the initial "west to east" policy, is now mainly targeting "east to south" approaches, particularly prioritizing the significant enhancement of the interest linkage with the Global South including the Middle East countries. Strengthening the planning of the Middle East agendas is fully in line with the overall strategic layout and diplomatic focus adjustment direction of Russia. In addition, Russia is about to assume the rotating presidency of the BRICS countries in 2024, so the three target countries of Putin's Middle East diplomatic push are all new members of the group. It is also of strategic significance for Russia to consolidate international status through the BRICS cooperation mechanism, set agendas closely related to its own interests and extend the attractiveness of the BRICS cooperation.
最后是推动重心转向。俄精英界普遍认为，即便俄乌双方能够实现停火或恢复谈判，为此轮乌克兰危机画上休止符，西方国家的对俄制裁仍然不会完全取消，对俄遏制围堵的路线也不会发生根本改变。因此，俄罗斯在地缘战略上的再次“向东转”需要提速。但从实践来看，这种战略转向在最初“由西向东”的基础上，现在又将“东转南向”作为主要目标，特别是显著增强与包括中东国家在内的“全球南方”的利益联系。加强对中东议程的谋划，完全符合俄罗斯战略布局和外交重心调整的大方向。另外，俄罗斯即将在2024年担任金砖国家轮值主席国，普京开展此轮中东“外交攻势”的三个对象国均为金砖的新成员。如何通过金砖国家合作机制稳固俄罗斯的国际地位，进行与自身利益诉求密切相关的议程设置，拓展金砖合作的吸引力等，同样具有战略性意义。
All in all, the Middle East agenda is emerging as a key link for Russia to break the diplomatic isolation situation, strengthen economic resilience in the face of sanctions and hedge against Western strategic pressure. However, amid the intricate interests entanglement behind the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, structural transformation of the global energy landscape and Western countries' consensual resistance, systematic isolation and bloc containment, Russia will still encounter many uncertainties to truly realize the diplomatic breakthrough.
总体而言，中东议程正在成为俄罗斯突破外交孤立局面、增强应对制裁的经济韧性、对冲西方战略压力的关键一环。但面对巴以冲突背后复杂的利益纠葛，全球能源版图的结构性转变，以及西方国家的共识性“反俄”、体系化“孤俄”和集团化“遏俄”举措，俄罗斯真正实现“外交突围”仍然面临诸多不确定性。
(The author is a researcher and Deputy Dean of Institute for Global Governance Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies)
（作者是上海国际问题研究院全球治理研究所副所长、研究员）
Editor's note: Originally published on opinion huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
