丁铎
By Ding Duo
近日，菲律宾再次试图向其坐滩中国南沙群岛仁爱礁的军舰非法运送建筑材料，被中国海警依法拦阻。正如中国有关部门所指出的，菲律宾的举动侵犯中国对南沙群岛仁爱礁的领土主权，违反《南海各方行为宣言》，破坏地区和平稳定。
Recently, the Philippines once again tried to illegally transport construction materials to its warship illegally grounded at Ren'ai Jiao in China's Nansha Qundao, but was intercepted by the China Coast Guard (CCG) in accordance with the law. As pointed out by relevant Chinese authorities, the Philippines' actions violated China's territorial sovereignty over Ren'ai Jiao in the Nansha Qundao, violated the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and undermined regional peace and stability.
菲律宾置中国在有关问题上保持的耐心、释放的善意和展现的克制于不顾，置双方就管控分歧而在操作层面达成的谅解和自身所做承诺于不顾，几无声誉和信誉可言。
The Philippines disregarded China's patience, goodwill, and restraint on relevant issues, as well as the understandings reached at the operational level on dispute management and its own commitments to this domain. Its behaviors fully demonstrated that the country lacks credibility and reputation.
观察马科斯政府近期在南海问题上的举措，不难发现其背后的种种动机。一是菲律宾长期非法觊觎中国南沙群岛有关岛礁，区别只是在于不同时段采取的侵权手段和掩护方式有所不同。二是受拜登政府强化美菲同盟关系的鼓励，菲律宾在华盛顿诱压、诱拉下调整南海政策，其冒险性、投机性越发突出。三是在南海仲裁案非法裁决出炉后，菲律宾一直试图通过多种方式将其“坐实”，并用裁决为其南海非法主张和海上挑衅举动背书。四是为了转移国内矛盾，菲律宾政府需要不断挑动海上局势升温来塑造一个“外敌”，缓解因国内高通胀、高失业率和毒品泛滥等突出问题而面临的执政压力。五是菲律宾担心今年美国大选的结果可能会对美菲同盟走向产生影响，因此试图通过制造海上摩擦来试探或拉华盛顿下水，看后者到底能对菲提供哪些实质性的安全保障。
The recent actions by the Marcos government regarding the South China Sea issue revealed various underlying motivations.
First, the Philippines has been illegally coveting the relevant islands and reefs of China's Nansha Qundao for a long time. The only difference lies in the infringement methods and cover methods adopted at different times.
Second, encouraged by the Biden administration to strengthen the US-Phillipine alliance, the Philippines has adjusted its South China Sea policy under Washington’s pressure and inducement, and is becoming increasingly adventurous and speculative.
Third, after the illegal award in the South China Sea arbitration case was released, the Philippines has been trying to "confirm" it through various methods and used the award to endorse its illegal claims and provocative maritime actions in the South China Sea.
Fourth, to divert domestic conflicts, the Philippine government needs to continue to stir up maritime tensions to create a "foreign enemy" and ease the pressure on governance due to prominent domestic problems such as high inflation rate, high unemployment rate, and drug flooding.
Fifth, the Philippines is worried that the results of this year's US election may have an impact on the US-Philippines alliance, so it is trying to test or drag down Washington by creating maritime friction to see what substantive security guarantees the US can provide.
要看到，菲律宾以“低烈度”方式在所谓“灰色地带”与中国缠斗并试图占小便宜的心态可能会持续一段时间，甚至不排除在马科斯任期内都将存在这种状况。与之相呼应的是在认知和法理层面，菲律宾包括美西方在国际舆论场以及双多边国际涉海场合的恶意炒作和对中国的污蔑抹黑也大概率不会停止。
It should be noted that the Philippines' mentality of engaging in "low-intensity" struggles in the so-called "gray areas" with China and attempting to take advantage may persist for some time, even during the whole term of the Marcos administration. Correspondingly, at the cognitive and legal level, the Philippines, including the US and the West, will most likely not stop maliciously hyping and slandering China in international public opinion arenas and on bilateral and multilateral international maritime-related occasions.
另一方面，菲律宾国内对于本国政府在南海问题上挑衅中国的牵制越来越少，马科斯决策核心团队和幕僚的“亲美疏华”立场非常明显。在这种背景下，菲律宾海警、防务部门、国家安全委员会等出于各自政治利益考虑，已经不太思考什么才是对中菲关系、对南海稳定最有利的，客观理性的声音越来越难以出现在菲律宾国内。
On the other hand, the Philippine public has less and less constraints on its government's provocations against China on the South China Sea issue. The "pro-US and anti-China" stance of Marcos' core decision-making team is obvious. In this context, the Philippine Coast Guard, Department of National Defense, National Security Council, and other government agencies of the Philippines, out of consideration of their respective political interests, have stopped thinking about what is most beneficial to China-Philippines relations and the stability of the South China Sea. Objective and rational voices are increasingly difficult to appear in the Philippines.
中国对菲律宾海上挑衅始终保持着高度警惕，也做好了应对准备，菲律宾对此不要抱有任何幻想。中国人讲“听其言观其行”，对菲律宾言而无信的做法，中方必将相应地采取强有力的反制举措。
China has always remained highly vigilant against Philippine maritime provocations and is prepared to respond accordingly. The Philippines should not harbor any illusions in this regard. The Chinese people believe that it is important to judge people by both their words and deeds. If the Philippines does not keep its word, China will take strong countermeasures accordingly.
在海上摩擦有所升温的情况下，菲律宾与部分国家通过海空联合巡逻、双多边军事演习，由此导致军事力量在南海集聚，不仅会给东盟国家带来不适，也可能会加剧冷战思维回潮，导致南海上演集团对抗。这是地区国家不愿意看到的，也是需要东盟国家和中国共同加以抵制的。
As maritime frictions heat up, the Philippines and some countries have conducted joint naval and air patrols and bilateral and multilateral military exercises, resulting in the accumulation of military forces in the South China Sea, which will not only bring discomfort to ASEAN countries but may also intensify the resurgence of Cold War mentality and lead to group confrontation in the South China Sea. This is something that regional countries do not want to see, and it needs to be resisted by ASEAN countries and China in a joint manner.
从历史经验和地区实际来看，菲律宾“引狼入室”的恶果最终将由地区国家来消化，东盟国家对此需要保持警惕，也应清醒地认识到，坚持有关争议问题由中国和当事国通过直接谈判磋商来解决，坚持南海的和平稳定由中国和东盟国家共同维护，对南海的长治久安和地区国家的长远利益至关重要。
Judging from historical experience and regional reality, the negative consequences of the Philippines' "set the fox to keep the geese" will eventually be borne by regional countries, ASEAN countries need to remain vigilant about this. It is crucial to the long-term peace and stability of the South China Sea and the interests of regional countries that relevant disputes are negotiated directly between China and the countries concerned, and peace and stability in the South China Sea are jointly maintained by China and ASEAN countries.
（作者是中国南海研究院海洋法律与政策研究所副所长）
(The author is deputy director at the Research Center for Ocean Law and Policy at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies.)
Editor's note: Originally published on opinion.huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
