By Dong Yifan
German government's release of its first National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as the Strategy) in mid-June has captured extensive attention as it marked the completion of Germany's adjustment of security, defense and diplomatic strategy since Chancellor Olaf Scholz's Zeitenwende (turn of the times) speech in February. The Strategy presents Germany's policy shifts in the following areas.
First, it emphasizes overall security. Underlining "strength, resilience and sustainability", the Strategy defines Germany's national security as comprising not only traditional security in military and defense, but also nontraditional security in economy and climate change. Scholz said Germany’s security policy has taken a drastic turn from "single military strategy to overall security".
Second, it places unprecedented stress on military security. The objectives and paths of Germany's defense security contained in the Strategy are very much an assembly of the policy discussions and initiatives made and proposed in the past few years. Centering on enhancing defense capability, the document underlines establishing a new strategic culture, vows to increase military spending to 2% of GDP starting from 2024, and replaces "disarmament" with "deterrence". The position and role of German armed forces in regional security affairs will shift from being focused on self-defense to being capable of fast response and swift actions.
Third, it underscores NATO and EU as the cornerstone of Germany's defense security. According to the Strategy, Berlin will fulfill Article 5 – Collective Defense – of the North Atlantic Treaty, the articles on mutual assistance of the Treaty of Maastricht, and the Franco-German commitment to mutual assistance, in a bid to intensify security by consolidating its defense duty and obligation with NATO and other EU members. Meanwhile, Berlin will continue to advance the reliability of NATO's nuclear deterrence through "nuclear sharing", including providing aircraft able to carry nuclear weapons.
Although the Strategy has put forth specific multi-dimensional measures to achieve security objectives, the road for Germany to realize "hard security" is bound to be bumpy.
For one thing, Germany's armaments have been out of practice for many years, and it's not easy for them to achieve "hard security". The Bundeswehr, or the armed forcesof the Federal Republic of Germany, has been slashed from 500,000 troops in 1990 to about 260,000 troops in 2022, with only 3/4 of the main weapon systems ready for use, 60% of helicopters unable to carry out missions, and submarines paralyzed. Since 2022, Berlin has provided so many weapons and equipment to Ukraine that its own troops are underequipped. At the same time, Germany's tedious procurement policies have impeded the implementation of its defense contracts, with massive military equipment projects subject to an average approving cycle of up to 50 months, 12 years at longest.
For another, increasing military spending to 2% of GDP faces financial restraints. That the Strategy has only been released recently since it was announced at this year's Munich Security Meeting indicates how difficult it is for Germany's ruling party to reach a consensus on security policies, and a most heated argument is over how much money should be spent and what should be achieved. Statistics show that Germany's defense spending in 2022 was US$57.8 billion, but it had to spend U$85.2 billion to reach NATO's defense spending standard according to the World Bank's official data of Germany's GDP in 2022. Due to inflation and other factors, only a small portion of the incremental financial expenditure goes to defense. Federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner admitted that new financing is needed to meet the defense spending target set in the Strategy, but no cost forecast can be given now.
Most importantly, the release of the Strategy means that dialogue, consultation, and other peaceful means are no longer the main approaches to national security for Germany as it will rely more on armed deterrence and military alliance. Whether the new approach will get Berlin the security guarantee it wants is still to be seen.
(The author is from the Institute of European Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations)
