By Hu Bo

US President Biden recently chaired the last quadrilateral security dialogue among the US, Japan, India and Australia within his term, after which the four countries issued a joint statement, the Wilmington Declaration, vowing to intensify the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), including launching joint coast guard patrols in 2025.

Except for some arrangements for mutual visits and interoperability, neither the US nor the other three countries revealed details such as the sea areas where they will carry out the joint patrol or the action plan. Considering the sensitivity of the South China Sea and the East China Sea, they would likely choose to act in the South Pacific and in waters within the jurisdiction of island states in the Indian Ocean, where they could enhance their presence and make some waves in the name of "assisting in addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities". 

Unlike navies, coast guards are law enforcement forces like the police, and their actions are more sensitive than naval operations. Without the permission of the coastal states concerned, no other country has the right to perform law enforcement activities in waters within their jurisdiction, whereas military operations of various kinds are allowed in their exclusive economic zones with "due regard".

The US is fully aware of this and is ready to hit the edge ball. In addition to stressing its military-civilian duality, the US Coast Guard has signed the "Shiprider Agreement" with a large group of Pacific island states in recent years, including the Cook Islands, Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Fiji, in the attempt to bypass or avert the legal issues concerning its operations in the waters of relevant countries. Previously, the US Coast Guard has already operated in the waters of several Pacific island states and boarded and inspected ships on their behalf. Now it is bringing on its three partners for three reasons: to make what it's doing strategically and diplomatically more justifiable through the increase in number, to shore up its deficiencies, and to get the Quad mechanism into action.

What's more, as the IPMDA is too obviously targeted at China, the joint coast guard patrol of the four countries, once in action, is bound to further complicate and aggravate the China-US strategic rivalry, and stimulate it to expand from the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea and the South China Sea to the entire Indo-Pacific region. That goes against the efforts by Chinese and American state and military leaders to manage the rivalry. Moreover, the move is anything but effective as it will do little to change the balance of power or contain China's development. All it will ever achieve is some extra media frenzy. 

Therefore, there is no need to overestimate the threats posed by the Quad's joint coast guard patrol. The Biden administration would spare no effort in bragging about the outcomes of the summit because it has to boost the Quad's morale, but there are many uncertainties and challenges to address before it can put its ideas into practice.

For one thing, the Coast Guard isn't as capable of long-distance power projection as the Navy. With the exception of the US Coast Guard, the coast guards of the other three countries all focus on neighboring waters without much capabilities of delivery elsewhere. Even the US Coast Guard itself, despite its ambitions, is far from meeting its own expectations in the West Pacific over recent years.

For another, the four Quad members vary greatly in systems and their attention to IUU and other issues, and the Coast Guard is a more inward-oriented force, making any substantial cooperation complicated and hard to come by.

Thirdly, where to carry out the joint patrol is of vital importance. Japan, India and Australia have their concerns about operating in waters around China for fear of "tit-for-tat" responses – if they send their coast guard or other law enforcement forces to patrol around China, China would react likewise. But if the choice of sea areas is too "mundane", the US as the leading party would risk losing its partners' trust and the patrol itself might be doubted in its meaningfulness. At the end of the day, the joint patrol plan may end up an embarrassment. 

(The author is the director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI))

Editor's note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn