By Chen Yang

As candidates for key positions such as the National Security Advisor and Secretary of Defense in the next US administration begin to surface, NATO is increasingly bracing for the return of a US president who remains skeptical of the alliance. With 32 member countries and military spending comprising 55% of global defense expenditure, NATO once again sees that its strength and stature are on the rise. However, the alliance may soon face a turbulent and challenging test ahead.

The foremost issue is the future of the Ukraine crisis. While no specific plan has been announced for ending the Russia-Ukraine conflict within 24 hours, members of the Trump team have recently indicated through the media that Ukraine should consider accepting some territorial losses to quickly achieve peace through negotiations. Another possibility is that the US may use military aid as leverage, pressuring Ukraine to make a clear commitment not to join NATO, thus paving the way for Russia-Ukraine peace talks. Should such a "peace agreement" be reached, it would undoubtedly deal a heavy blow to NATO.

As is well known, NATO was founded during the Cold War, a time of opposition between two blocs, meaning its primary adversary has always been—and can only be—Russia. It is through its ongoing struggle with Russia that NATO has been able to secure strategic resources. If the US successfully brokers a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire, NATO's considerable investments in the conflict would be rendered futile. This would not only undermine its past efforts but also abruptly end its role as the "guardian of the free world" in relation to Russia. Moreover, it could halt NATO's eastward expansion and military upgrades, potentially leading to a major setback for the alliance.

A pressing issue making a comeback is NATO's military spending targets. In recent years, under pressure from the US, and in response to the Ukraine crisis, NATO's European members have significantly increased defense spending, with military expenditures rising by 50% over the past decade. In 2014, only four NATO members met the target of spending at least 2% of GDP on defense, while by 2024, this number is expected to rise to more than 20, with Poland and Estonia even surpassing the US in defense spending as a share of GDP.

However, whether these efforts will be deemed "sufficient" by the next US administration remains uncertain, and NATO leaders are not guaranteed to get a pass. During his first presidency, Trump criticized NATO members for failing to meet the target, accusing them of "hitchhiking" on US contributions and suggesting raising the military spending target to 4%. Now, NATO finds itself having to take the issue of military spending targets more seriously. Recently, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that spending only 2% was insufficient to meet their goals.

The problem, however, is that if the military spending targets are further raised, many European countries may struggle to meet the demands, especially the larger powers. Germany and France are already grappling with worsening fiscal challenges, which could possibly escalate into full-blown fiscal crises. In such a context, raising military spending targets could disrupt their economic stability. For countries like Italy and Spain, whose defense spending still falls short of the target, a higher benchmark would make the goal even more unattainable, potentially straining their relationship with NATO. Consequently, the issue of military spending targets will likely persist in the next four years, probably becoming a focal point of renewed tension and strategic maneuvering between Europe and the US over NATO.

At the heart of the matter is the security framework within NATO and Europe. Put simply, the question is what role will the US play in European security. Sources close to the incoming US administration's national security team indicate that the US plans to substantially scale back its security role in Europe, shifting from being the primary provider of military strength to offering support only in times of crisis. As a result, NATO will need to "reposition itself" to adapt to this new reality.

When Trump's election victory was all but confirmed, Rutte was quick to congratulate him, stating, "Through NATO, the US has 31friends and allies who help to advance US interests, multiply American power and keep Americans safe." Yet, his words revealed a clear unease about the incoming president. In fact, the next four years of transatlantic interactions will give rise to what kind of "NATO 2.0" , and how the alliance will save itself from the potential storms that may be stirred up by Washington, has become the pressing  questions for NATO.

(The author is the Executive Director of the Institute of European Studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.)

Editor's note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.