By Li Chao

According to Japanese media reports, Japan plans to provide defense equipment to the Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia and Djibouti under the framework of the Official Security Assistance (OSA) by the end of the 2024 fiscal year on March 31, 2025. The total aid is expected to reach 5 billion yen ($33 million). Subsequently, reports emerged that Japan had signed an agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology with Mongolia. It will take effect once the two governments complete the necessary procedures.

It is proposed in the 2022 edition of the National Security Strategy (NSS) of Japan to establish a cooperation framework for the benefit of Japan's armed forces and other related organizations. Based on this strategy, the OSA mechanism was created in 2023. In the same year, Japan released the first list of recipient countries and projects via the platform, providing patrol boats, coastal radar systems, and other equipment to the Philippines, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Fiji. Mongolia is among the second batch of recipient countries. The signing of the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology between Japan and Mongolia also indicates that the two countries are moving toward this goal. So, why has Mongolia become a key target of Japan's efforts under the OSA framework?

First, Japan seeks to make full use of the existing foundation of bilateral relations. Japan has been one of Mongolia's largest aid providers in economic and investment sectors since the transformation of the state system. In 2022, Japan and Mongolia developed into a Special Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, accompanied by a 10-year action plan. This plan includes the establishment of a legal framework for defense equipment transfer and Japan's intention to provide defense equipment and technology. Japan views deepening military ties as a further response to the latest positioning of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Second, it is driven by the geopolitical strategy of Japan. In 2023, during his visit to India, then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida unveiled a new action plan aimed at achieving the so-called "free and open Indo-Pacific." The plan outlined four key pillars, the first is "principles for peace and rules for prosperity," the second is "addressing challenges in an Indo-Pacific way," the third is a "multi-layered connectivity," and the fourth is "extending efforts for security and safe use of the sea to the air."

According to the 2024 Defense of Japan, "it is critical for Japan to deepen cooperation and collaboration with our ally, like-minded countries, and other partners with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests." Obviously, Japan regards Mongolia as one of the "like-minded" countries and hopes to weaken the military relations between other major powers and Mongolia through security cooperation under the OSA framework. By leveraging Mongolia's geographical proximity to China and Russia and its unique geopolitical influence, Japan aims to have Mongolia contribute to the construction of its so-called "free and open Indo-Pacific."

It can be foreseen that with the implementation of the defense equipment and technology transfer agreement between the two countries, the influence of Japan on Mongolia in the defense field will be enhanced. However, the OSA framework of Japan, which claims to enhance the security and defense capabilities of other countries, is in fact laden with geopolitical rivalry and mixed with Japan's own agenda of seeking military loosening. Its clear deviation from the path of peaceful development has already raised concerns among anti-war groups within Japan and alerted other countries. If we consider Japan's latest actions in the broader context of Mongolia's growing military trust with its neighboring countries, the space for Japan to manipulate security issues becomes even more limited.

(The author is an associate researcher at the Belt and Road Institute of the Inner Mongolia Academy of Social Science)

Editor's note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.