By Zhao Long

The US's plan to "purchase" Greenland has continued to spark uproar in international public opinion. This incident not only reflects a significant shift in Washington's strategic thinking under the "America First" doctrine, but also highlights the spillover effects of profound changes in the regional security landscape.

During the Cold War, Greenland was the frontline and strategic highland in the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the bipolar world order collapsed, and the primary focus in the Arctic region gradually shifted from military security to multilateral governance.

At the same time, an "intermediate zone", represented by Sweden and Finland, emerged in the Arctic security landscape during the Cold War. It served as both a strategic deterrent and a security buffer. However, the sharp escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 completely altered this situation. The prolonged crisis and ongoing military conflict not only overturned Europe's existing security architecture, but also led to the complete dissolution of the "intermediate zone" due to NATO's northern expansion, which in turn profoundly impacted regional security.

First, it has intensified the confrontational nature of the security landscape. Highly sensitive to security issues, both NATO and Russia have continuously intensified their military deployments. In recent years, NATO has significantly upgraded the frequency, scale, and equipment levels of its military exercises in the Arctic region, and Russia has also taken corresponding countermeasures. This tit-for-tat situation has led to the gradual dissolution of the security buffer based on the "intermediate zone," significantly escalating the confrontation in the region.

Second, it has weakened the identity recognition. After the Cold War, the Arctic developed two intertwined forms of identity recognition, namely natural geography and political geography. The former, based on natural indicators such as the Arctic Circle, isotherms, and maritime spaces, shaped the unique geopolitical identity of the "Arctic countries." Political identity recognition is primarily reflected in international cooperation mechanisms. However, with the disappearance of the Arctic "intermediate zone," the vulnerability of this identity recognition has significantly increased. The Arctic 7 increasingly views Russia as an adversary and is committed to strengthening security coordination from the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea to the Arctic Ocean, gradually constructing a binary opposition between the "NATO Arctic" and the "Russian Arctic."

Third, it has broken the balance of the governance agenda. With the increasing human activity in the Arctic region, relevant countries had previously reached a consensus on addressing non-traditional security threats. However, with the outbreak and intensification of the Ukraine crisis, traditional security concerns gradually overshadowed non-traditional security issues. The strategic goals of "great power competition" became the primary driving force. In 2022, the US government released an updated National Strategy for the Arctic Region, deliberately highlighting that the Arctic activities of China and Russia triggered regional tensions. It prioritized the development of Arctic military capabilities and strengthening security cooperation with allies and partners. What is particularly concerning is that China and Russia's Arctic cooperation, focusing on scientific exploration and sustainable use, has been further stigmatized. This distorted interpretation not only ignored the scientific and open nature of China and Russia's cooperation, but also diverted attention given to the climate and environmental security issues in the Arctic region.

It can be anticipated that the vanishment of the "intermediate zone" will not only intensify the geopolitical confrontation in the Arctic, but also profoundly impact the involvement of external stakeholders. Therefore, stakeholders in Arctic affairs must urgently enhance coordination on non-traditional security and sustainable development issues, such as climate, ecology, and environment, so as to prevent the evolution of the security landscape from further weakening the effectiveness of multilateral governance.

(The author is a deputy director and researcher of the Institute for International Strategic Studies, the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies)

Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.