By Liu Chen

At the beginning of this month, the European Union (EU) held a special summit in Brussels, approving the "ReArm Europe" special financing plan proposed by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. The plan marks the most profound transformation of Europe's security order since the end of the Cold War, signaling a shift in European strategic autonomy from concept to substantive advancement.

Recently, Emmanuel Macron convened domestic defense companies at the Élysée Palace, urging them to increase weapon production and positioning France as the center of Europe's rearmament. However, France's path to leading Europe's defense autonomy is destined to be fraught with challenges, because it is dependent not only on its ability to overcome fiscal and political bottlenecks but also on Europe's capacity to achieve historic breakthroughs in strategic consensus, interest distribution, and risk-sharing.

France is the only nuclear power in the EU, possessing approximately 290 nuclear warheads, making it the world's fourth-largest nuclear arsenal. Its independent nuclear decision-making mechanism, where the French President has sole authority over the "nuclear button," contrasts sharply with NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, which underscores France's distinctive role in European defense. France is also the only country in Europe with full-spectrum research and development capabilities for nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and missiles.

However, can France truly shoulder the heavy responsibility of leading European defense autonomy with ease?

From a military perspective, France's nuclear arsenal is relatively limited in both scale and variety. According to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), France can issue a unique, one-time nuclear warning but is not suited for direct confrontation with another nuclear power, making it an inadequate substitute for the US nuclear umbrella. Despite France's declaration of a "wartime economy" in 2022, urging defense companies to accelerate weapons production and even emphasizing the possibility of mandatory measures to require defense companies to speed up capacity, it has struggled to meet the growing demand for arms procurement.

From a financial perspective, the source of the funds remains unresolved. Currently, French defense companies are demanding government guarantees. President Emmanuel Macron has also pledged to increase defense spending by raising the share of defense expenditure from the current 2.1% of GDP to 3%–3.5%. However, raising defense spending to 3% would mean France needs to add at least €30 billion to its annual defense budget. Meanwhile, France's public finances are severely imbalanced, with the public deficit expected to reach 6.6% of GDP in 2025, more than double the 3% limit set by the EU's Stability and Growth Pact.

From a European perspective, persuading European allies to break away from reliance on the US in the short term is no easy task. France, leveraging its independent nuclear deterrence, holds a leading position in promoting European defense autonomy. For example, regarding France offering a nuclear umbrella to Europe, countries like Poland and Lithuania responded positively, while Nordic countries remained cautious, and Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain showed relatively lukewarm attitudes. The significant differences in national positions make it quite difficult to establish a coordinated and unified European nuclear security framework.

Overall, while France has both the willingness and a certain level of strength to champion Europe's defense autonomy, it remains difficult to shoulder this heavy burden in the short term. As US foreign policy becomes increasingly uncertain and Europe's security environment continues to evolve, the demand for European defense autonomy is expected to grow further. If France can effectively resolve its financial difficulties, properly manage domestic and international differences, efficiently integrate Europe's defense industrial resources, and establish a joint command system, it could still play a more pivotal leadership role in advancing European defense autonomy.

(The author is an associate research fellow at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations.)

Editor's Note: Originally published on china.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.