By Yuan Yue
According to the Financial Times on Monday, citing informed sources, Germany will abandon its long-standing opposition to nuclear power and no longer block France's efforts to ensure nuclear power is treated on par with renewable energy in EU legislation. The policy shift has drawn attention not only in the energy sector but also for its implicit connection to France's nuclear deterrence strategy, thus sparking broader discussions. A German official commented on the matter, "We are now actually finally open to talk to France about nuclear deterrence for Europe. Better late than never."
What makes the nuclear issue of France unique is the high degree of overlap between its civilian nuclear energy and military nuclear capabilities in terms of technological systems, industrial structure, and institutional arrangements, which forms a nuclear ecosystem that exemplifies civil-military integration. Specifically, the pressurized water reactor (PWR) technology for civilian nuclear power plants in France follows the same technological line as the technology for reactors deployed on its nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. In addition, the core players in France's nuclear industry, such as Framatome and Orano, serve both civilian nuclear power stations and military nuclear facilities. Regarding nuclear security and safety supervision mechanisms, France has a distinctive institutional feature. It is one of the few countries in the world that brings military nuclear facilities under the civilian nuclear safety regulatory framework. The French Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Authority (ASNR) issues operating licenses for both civilian nuclear power plants and military submarine bases. This indicates that France's nuclear technology operates under an integrated system where civilian and military sectors are managed through the same regulatory process.
Against this backdrop, Germany's explicit recognition and support of France's nuclear policy not only helps to resolve long-standing differences between the two countries in energy economics, industrial foundations, and EU legislation but also serves as an indirect endorsement of France's integrated nuclear industry model. To some extent, this can be seen as Germany's tacit political endorsement of France's proposal to use its "nuclear umbrella" to protect Europe, which would open up more flexible and easily justifiable initial cooperation space for future coordination between Germany and France on nuclear-related administration, corporate partnerships, funding sharing, technological collaboration, and even potential military cooperation.
Furthermore, if Germany plans to increase imports of French nuclear power, engage in certain technical and market collaborations, or support including Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technology on the EU's list of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs), its strategic calculations go beyond energy, because such moves could help build stronger political legitimacy within Germany's domestic framework for sharing the EU defense budget. Meanwhile, they would strengthen the government's case to parliament for participating in the maintenance costs of France's strategic nuclear submarines, ease internal opposition in German society, and create practical new options for Germany to support the modernization of French nuclear forces through investment.
Therefore, the shift of the Merz cabinet in nuclear policy is not merely a tactical adjustment but a strategic probe across multiple dimensions, including energy security, economic interests, and European defense. This shift also reflects a profound transformation in the EU's overall governance framework. The proactive stance between France and Germany on nuclear energy could serve as a model for the EU's transition from technological dependence to an autonomous technological and industrial alliance.
To reach this goal, France and Germany must go beyond their usual historic roles. They need to stop simply repeating the old pattern where France takes the lead and Germany follows. Instead, they should work together to establish a new framework of cooperation that balances both shared interests and mutual risks. Europe can secure a stronger position in fierce global competition only when its "twin engines" achieve genuine coordination in strategic intent, political trust, and institutional innovation. The shift of the Merz cabinet in nuclear policy may well mark the starting point of this profound transformation.
(The author is a scholar from the Institute of International Relations at China Foreign Affairs University.)
Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
