By Guo Xiaobing
The tenth review conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which has been long postponed by the pandemic, was finally held in New York on August 1. The NPT review conference is held every five years since 1975 to discuss the performance of the treaty and where international nuclear arms control should be heading. The conference this year is of special significance because the three pillars of the treaty – nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy – have all encountered some new problems and challenges that are pushing the international nuclear order to a new crossroads between governance and chaos.
In nuclear disarmament, the continuous reduction in nuclear weapons after the Cold War is tapering, and signs of a countercurrent against disarmament are emerging. More than a decade ago, major countries in the world were calling for a world free from nuclear weapons, and arms control think tanks were outlining various roadmaps for their thorough destruction. Today, however, all those good hopes have gone down the drain.
The reality now is that nuclear weapons are growing in number. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) forecast the international nuclear arsenal to bottom out and rebound soon. The UK announced last year to raise the cap of its nuclear warheads by 40%, to 260. The threshold of using nuclear weapons is lowering. The US announced in 2018 that it will counter attacks from non-nuclear strategic weapons, such as space and cyber attacks, with nuclear weapons, which the Biden administration has neither rectified nor clarified so far. London also vowed to tackle the threats from emerging technologies such as cyber, AI, encryption and laser weapons with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are of better quality. America’s new-generation strategic bomber B-21 Raider will debut in 2023, the new-generation Columbia-class strategic nuclear submarine will enter the water in 2028, and the new-generation land-based intercontinental ballistic missile Sentinel will replace the Minuteman-III missile that has served for over half a century in 2029.
In nuclear non-proliferation, new risks and hotspots of proliferation are taking form. Previously the hot zones for proliferation were concentrated in a few developing countries, but in recent years, the deals among developed countries have increased the risks of transferring nuclear materials and technologies. The US and the UK are planning to transfer nuclear submarines to Australia under the AUKUS framework, and the amount of highly enriched uranium carried by them may be enough to make 60 to 80 nuclear warheads. In July, the UK announced its plan to dispatch nuclear submarine detachments to Australia, adding complexity to the nuclear collaboration in the small Anglo-Saxon circle. The right-wingers in Japan are clamoring for “nuclear sharing” with the US following NATO’s example.
Given all these challenges and divergences, different parties have put forth many suggestions and ideas. They generally agree on the following two points.
First, nuclear weapon states must reach a new consensus on global strategic stability. Compared with the Cold War period, the global strategic stability today is more complex, of which the hang is non-first use of nuclear weapons. Given the weapons’ massive destructive power, mutual commitment to non-first use would be a relief to everyone, thus lowering the level of alert and the risk of misfiring.
Second, the same gauge must be applied to all issues of nuclear proliferation. Exercising double standards – calling for the prevention of nuclear proliferation on the one hand while cutting corners for geopolitical purposes on the other – won’t gain trust from anyone and cannot effectively respond to non-nuclear weapon states’ questioning about the rationality and validity of the non-proliferation regime.
It’s not easy to put into practice the understandable and feasible measures. That requires the NPT contracting parties, especially major countries, to forsake the narrow-minded mindset of major-country competition, seek common ground while shelving differences, and make joint efforts for the common security of all humanity.
(The author is director of the Center for Arms Control Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations)
Editor's Note: This article is originally published on huanqiu.com, and is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information, ideas or opinions appearing in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
