The US, the UK and Australia's attempt to whitewash their nuclear submarine cooperation failed again – for the fourth time. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on September 12 agreed at its fourth consultation to discuss issues around the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation as a separate, formal subject, which means the cooperation is not something that the three countries can just decide among themselves – it must be governed by all IAEA members.
美英澳三国小圈子想搞暗箱操作把核潜艇合作“洗白白”，结果迎来第四次失败。12日，国际原子能机构理事会会议第四次协商一致决定，以单独正式议题形式讨论美英澳核潜艇合作有关问题。这意味着，三国核潜艇合作不是三国可以私自处理的，必须由机构成员国共同来管。
The US, the UK and Australia announced the establishment of a trilateral security partnership, known as AUKUS, on September 15, 2021, the core of which is for the US and the UK to assist Australia in building nuclear-powered submarines. The transfer of nuclear materials involved in the process is essentially a kind of nuclear proliferation, which has caused great concerns in the international community as that will aggravate the arms race, sabotage regional peace and stability, and seriously undermine the international non-proliferation regime.
一年前的9月15日，美英澳宣布建立三边安全合作伙伴（奥库斯AUKUS），核心计划是美英将协助澳大利亚打造核动力潜艇。这其中涉及的核武器材料转让本质上是核扩散，它将加剧军备竞赛，破坏地区和平稳定，严重冲击国际核不扩散体系，因此引发国际社会极大关切。
As contracting parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the US, the UK and Australia should perform their non-proliferation obligations, yet they, turning a blind eye to the subject of nuclear submarine cooperation unanimously adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors, turned another way and tried to privately negotiate with IAEA's Secretariat on the safeguards and supervisory arrangements for the cooperation to cover up their act of nuclear proliferation.
美英澳都是《不扩散核武器条约》的缔约国，理应履行核不扩散义务。但三国无视国际原子能机构理事会以协商一致方式通过的核潜艇合作相关议题，另起炉灶，企图同机构秘书处擅自谈判核潜艇合作保障监督安排，以遮掩核扩散行径。
But whatever tricks they play, they cannot change the basic fact that the trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation involves the transfer of weapons-grade enriched uranium and relevant technologies and equipment, which contains serious risks of nuclear proliferation, violates the purposes and principles of NPT, and exceeds the mandate of IAEA Secretariat. It must be discussed and decided by all IAEA members.
无论它们玩什么花样，都无法改变一个基本事实：三国核潜艇合作涉及武器级浓缩铀及相关技术、设备的转让，存在严重核扩散风险，违反《不扩散核武器条约》的目的和宗旨，超出了国际原子能机构秘书处的职责范围，必须由机构成员国共同讨论决定。
That the IAEA Board of Governors meeting has thwarted AUKUS' under-the-table movements four times tells us that the agency has seen through the clique's real intention of ganging up for Cold-War-like confrontation, and America and Britain's double standards of expressing concerns over the Korean Peninsula and Iran nuclear issues on the one hand and greenlighting the nuclear submarine cooperation with Australia on the other.
现在，国际原子能机构理事会会议连续四次挫败美英澳的暗箱操作，说明大家都看清了奥库斯的本质就是搞拉帮结伙、冷战对抗那一套，看清美英一边就朝核、伊核问题表达关切、一边在同澳核潜艇合作问题上“开绿灯”，是典型的双标。
From the establishment of AUKUS in September 2021 to the signing of the Agreement for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information in November, which allowed Australia to obtain confidential nuclear submarine information from the US and the UK, to Canberra's announcement in March 2022 that it will build a new submarine base on the east coast to berth its future nuclear submarines and support the regular visits by American and British ones, the series of moves have put regional countries on edge. China, Indonesia, and other countries have all submitted documents to the tenth review meeting of the NPT held in August, expressing their concerns over the possible nuclear proliferation risks stemming from the AUKUS cooperation.
从去年9月奥库斯成立，到当年11月签署《海军核动力信息交换协议》、正式允许澳获取美英机密的核潜艇信息，再到今年3月澳声称将在东海岸建造一个新潜艇基地、用来停靠澳未来的核潜艇并支持美英核潜艇定期访问，这一系列举动让地区国家越来越不安。中国、印度尼西亚等国都向8月份举行的《不扩散核武器条约》第十次审议大会提交了工作文件，就核动力潜艇合作引发的核扩散风险提出诸多关切。
Instead of answering the international community's concerns, the AUKUS members are still being evasive about the details of their cooperation and have made it hard for IAEA to exercise effective supervision. What this Anglo-Saxon clique is up to in Asia Pacific is clear to all – it wants to copy NATO's old pattern of stirring up regional conflicts and confrontation in the region. Jusuf Wanandi, a senior fellow and co-founder of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Indonesia, said the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation has thrown the region into a serious risk of nuclear proliferation, and Indonesia is strongly indignant about that.
然而到目前，美英澳三国没有回应国际社会关切，仍在核潜艇合作细节上遮遮掩掩，还霸道地给国际原子能机构有效实施监管出难题。这个盎格鲁—撒克逊小圈子想在亚太地区干什么，大家都能看出来——无非是想将北约挑动地区冲突对抗的老套路复制到亚太地区。印尼战略与国际研究中心资深研究员及联合创始人尤素福·瓦南迪表示，美英澳三国核潜艇合作，使地区陷入严重的核扩散风险，印尼各方表示强烈愤怒。
Nuclear weapons are the sword of Damocles hanging over humanity. UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the risk of using nuclear weapons may have come to its highest level since the Cold War period. The nuclear submarine cooperation among the US, the UK and Australia is not their private matter, much less is it up to them to decide. They must give the world a definite answer on how to perform the non-proliferation obligations, and give up the plot to cover up their nuclear endeavors.
核武器是悬在人类头上的“达摩克利斯之剑”。联合国秘书长古特雷斯警告说，目前核武器被使用的风险可能是冷战时代以来最高的。美英澳核潜艇合作绝不是它们的私事，更不能由它们说了算。如何履行防扩散义务，三国必须给世界一个交代，它们别想把“核”谋藏进暗箱。
Editor's note: This article is originally published on cri.cn, and is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information, ideas or opinions appearing in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
