VIENNA, Sept. 16 -- A meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on September 15 discussed the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation as a standalone, formal agenda item. At the meeting, the member states expressed grave concerns over "seven issues" regarding trilateral cooperation proposed by China.
维也纳9月16日电 -- 9月15日，国际原子能机构理事会在中方推动设置、成员国四次协商一致通过的单独正式议题下，专门讨论美英澳核潜艇合作问题。广大成员国在会上对三国核潜艇合作的“七大问题”表达了严重关切。
Wang Qun, China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Vienna, said the nuclear submarine cooperation among the US, the UK and Australia is a downright practice of nuclear proliferation as it involves the illegal transfer of nuclear materials. However, the three countries have been beating around the bush about the proliferation nature of their deal and trying to mislead the international community by confusing right and wrong. To refute their fallacies, China listed “seven issues” regarding the trilateral nuclear deal, which were echoed and endorsed by the IAEA members.
王群说，美英澳核潜艇合作涉及核武器材料非法转让，是赤裸裸的核扩散行径。但一直以来，三国始终回避其核扩散行径的问题本质，混淆是非，误导国际社会。为澄清三国谬论，中方在会上历数三国合作的“七大问题”，得到了机构广大成员国的普遍呼应。
First, the three countries have been trying to cover up the fact that their nuclear submarine cooperation involves the illegal transfer of nuclear weapon materials with the excuse of “naval reactor”, which, however, is essentially a practice of nuclear proliferation.
王群指出，第一，三国用所谓“海军动力堆”为借口，极力回避三国合作涉及核武器材料非法转让这一“原罪”，其所涉“海军动力堆”问题本质上是核扩散行为。
Second, the three countries are trying to confuse the matters of military activities within a country’s sovereignty and nuclear proliferation. Their nuclear submarine cooperation is not as simple as a sovereign state independently developing nuclear materials used in military submarines. It is the first time that nuclear weapon states blatantly, directly transfer tons of nuclear weapon materials to a non-nuclear weapon state. These are two very different things.
第二，三国混淆一国主权范围内的军事活动与核扩散行径。三国核潜艇合作不是简单的主权国家自主研发军用舰艇所涉核材料问题，而是首次由核武器国家公然、直接向无核武器国家非法转让成吨成吨的核武器材料，两者不能混淆。
Third, the three countries’ ploy to mislead the public with the rhetoric that “nuclear materials are stocked in the reactor and cannot be directly used to make nuclear weapons” won’t work. The linchpin of the problem with the cooperation lies in nuclear proliferation, not how to dispose of the nuclear materials. Given its proliferation nature, the trilateral deal won’t reduce the risk against nuclear security and safeguards, as well as the danger of nuclear proliferation.
第三，三国以所谓“核材料封存在反应堆中，无法直接用于核武器”误导舆论，也完全行不通。事实上，三国核潜艇合作的问题出在核扩散，而非相关核武器材料如何处置。三国合作鉴于其核扩散本质，更无法降低有关核安全、核安保和核扩散风险。
Fourth, the three countries, especially Australia, violated the obligation of the declaration provided in IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and relevant protocols. In the past year since it officially announced the trilateral deal, Australia has not once made any substantive report to the IAEA, which is a violation of its safeguards obligation.
第四，三国，尤其是澳大利亚，违反机构全面保障监督协定和相关议定书规定的申报义务。澳在正式宣布三国核潜艇合作决定近一年来，迄未按要求向机构作出任何实质性报告，已违反其保障监督法律义务。
Fifth, the three countries have flagrantly, without authorization, engaged with IAEA Secretariat to directly determine relevant safeguards. Their nuclear submarine cooperation has set a bad example of nuclear proliferation, which is beyond the current scope of safeguards. Therefore, a solution to it must be discussed and determined by all IAEA members, each having a say in it.
第五，三国公然越俎代庖坚持擅自与机构秘书处直接确定相关保障监督方案。三国核潜艇合作开创核扩散恶劣先例，超出现有保障监督体系范畴，必须由机构全体成员国共同讨论解决方案，机构全体成员国必须拥有最终话语权。
Sixth, the three countries have harmed IAEA’s function and authority in preventing nuclear proliferation and hijacked the Secretariat to engage in activities prohibited by the Statute of IAEA. They attempted to coerce the Secretariat into exempting their nuclear submarine cooperation from the safeguards. Then, with their majority seats, they can force the Board of Governors to adopt their deal and consequently legitimize the proliferating practice. China supports IAEA in strictly implementing Article 2 of the Statute, namely relevant budget shall not be used for any activity that supports any military purpose.
第六，三国损害机构防扩散职能和权威，绑架秘书处从事《规约》禁止的活动。三国企图胁迫秘书处提出豁免三国核潜艇合作的保障监督方案，然后凭借自己在理事会的票数优势，强行推动理事会通过，从而使其非法扩散行径合法化。中方支持机构严格按照《规约》第2条规定，相关预算不得用于任何支持推进军事目的的活动。
Seventh, the three countries, on the grounds that no cooperation scheme has been finalized yet, refuse to report to IAEA the substantive progress on their cooperation, so the Director General and Secretariat are unable to make a substantive report to the Board of Governors on the deal or perform the reporting obligation provided in the Statute.
第七，三国始终以“未确定合作方案”为由，拒不向机构报告核潜艇合作实质进展，使总干事和秘书处无法就三国向此次理事会作出实质性报告，也无法有效履行机构《规约》规定的报告义务。
These are the “seven issues” about the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation, said Wang Qun, noting that if we just allow them to make a fake report to IAEA about their nuclear submarine cooperation and hijack the Secretariat to become the Trojan Horse helping them whitewash their proliferating practice and exempt their cooperation from the safeguards, that will seriously damage the common interests of the international community, including the Secretariat and all IAEA members.
王群最后表示，以上就是三国核潜艇合作的“七大问题”。如果任由三国“假装”向机构申报三国核潜艇合作情况，绑架秘书处使之沦为“洗白”三国核扩散行径、豁免三国核潜艇合作的“特洛伊木马”，将严重损害包括机构秘书处和全体成员国在内的国际社会共同利益。
