By Guo Xiaobing

郭晓兵

The US Department of Defense recently released its annual China Military Power Report, which says China currently has 400 nuclear warheads, which will increase to 1,000 in 2030 and 1,500 in 2035. To fabricate the so-called “China threat” as an excuse to ask Congress for more military budget, the DoD has cooked up this lie-strewn report based on hearsay and wild imagination without mentioning where the data came from. This typical stunt of a thief crying “stop thief” is aimed at covering up the following disgraceful actions in the area of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.

近期，一年一度的美国国防部“中国军力报告”出炉，称中国目前拥有400枚现役核弹头，2030年将拥有1000枚，2035年将拥有1500枚。为了捏造所谓的“中国威胁”，为了向国会索要更多军费，美国国防部道听途说、肆意妄想，杜撰了这份所谓的“中国军力报告”，对于数据来源却只字不提，恐怕是贼喊捉贼，旨在为其在核军控与防扩散领域的不光彩行径作掩护。

The US is keeping an ultra-low threshold of using nuclear weapons for integrated deterrence. Washington has expanded the scope of its nuclear deterrence to cope with non-nuclear strategic threats from space and the cyber domain during Trump’s term. Its newly released Nuclear Posture Review report drums about integrated deterrence instead of using such terms as “non-first use” and “sole purpose”, which means the country will use nuclear weapons to not only deter nuclear attacks but also other strategic attacks. That will further blur the boundary between nuclear and conventional forces, and intensify the coordination between nuclear and non-nuclear programs, exercises, and actions.

劣迹一：实施一体化威慑，维持过低的核武器使用门槛。在特朗普政府时期，美国就扩大核威慑范围，应对天、网等非核战略威胁。在最近刚刚公布的《核态势审议报告》中，美国并未采用“不首先使用”或“唯一目的”的提法，而是大肆鼓吹一体化威慑，这表明美国不仅要用核武器来威慑核攻击，还用其威慑其他战略攻击，并将进一步模糊核常界限，加强核与非核计划、演习和行动之间的协调。

The US is detailing customized deterrence and getting ready to fight two nuclear wars, including the limited-scale one. The US claims that by 2030, it will for the first time in history face a situation when two major nuclear states will be its strategic competitors and potential rivals, and it’s prepared to fight on both sides. “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor… recognizing that a near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.” Therefore, the Biden administration has further detailed the nuclear deterrence strategy customized by the Trump administration to target China and Russia.

劣迹二：细化定制威慑，准备打两场核战争，包括有限核战争。美国渲染，到2030年，美将在其历史上首次面临两个主要核大国作为战略竞争对手和潜在对手的局面。美国准备两面出击，“在与一个竞争对手潜在冲突时，阻止另一个竞争对手的侵略行为”，甚至认为在极端情况下可能与“两个核武器国家”同时发生冲突。为此，拜登政府进一步细化特朗普政府提出来的针对中国、俄罗斯的定制核威慑战略。

The US has extended deterrence by reinforcing the “Indo-Pacific” nuclear sharing mechanism and the forward deployment of strategic forces. The US military intends to strengthen the consultation with its Indo-Pacific allies on extended deterrence by discussing nuclear deterrence policies, sharing strategic intelligence, and strengthening bloc cooperation. For that purpose, it will form a US-Japan-ROK or US-Japan-ROK-Australia information sharing and dialogue mechanism, thus duplicating the NATO-like nuclear alliance in the West Pacific. The US will also deploy strategic bombers, dual-purpose warplanes and nuclear weapons in the “Indo-Pacific” to highlight its presence.

劣迹三：强化延伸威慑，加强“印太”核共享机制和战略力量前沿部署。美军有意强化与“印太”盟国的延伸威慑磋商，共同商量核威慑政策，共享战略情报，强化集团合作。为此，美将构建美日韩三边或美日韩澳四边信息共享和对话机制，从而在西太平洋复制一套类似北约的核同盟来。在前沿部署方面，美将在“印太”部署战略轰炸机、双用途战机和核武器，将通过战略核潜艇和战略轰炸机访问展示自身存在。

The US keeps updating its nuclear arsenal. The latest Nuclear Posture Review has abandoned the Obama administration’s commitment to not producing new types of nuclear warheads but continued to promote the nuclear Triad. On the land, the intercontinental ballistic missile Sentinel will replace the Minuteman III on schedule to become the new-generation land-based deterrence force. On the sea, the Columbia-class strategic nuclear submarine will replace the Ohio-class counterpart in 2030. In the air, the B-21 strategic bomber Raider will replace B-2A, while F-35A fighters, carrying nuclear warheads, will also take the place of F-15E gradually to carry out NATO’s nuclear missions.

劣迹四：持续推进核武库更新换代。美国新版《核态势审议报告》放弃了奥巴马政府“不生产新型核弹头”的承诺，并继续推进核“三位一体”升级换代。陆基方面，“哨兵”洲际弹道导弹将如期取代“民兵III”成为新一代陆基威慑力量。海基方面，“哥伦比亚级”战略核潜艇将从2030年起取代“俄亥俄级”战略核潜艇。空基方面，B-21“突袭者”战略轰炸机将取代B-2A战略轰炸机。F-35A战斗机也将携带核弹头，逐步取代F-15E战斗机执行北约核任务。

The US’ development and deployment of low-yield nuclear warheads increase the risk of nuclear conflict. To prepare for limited-scale nuclear warfare, the Trump administration suggested putting the low-yield warhead W76-2 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and sea-based cruise missiles. The Democratic Party said in its 2020 campaigning program that W76-2 is unnecessary, but the new Nuclear Posture Review supports its production and continued use on submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

劣迹五：发展和部署低当量核弹头，增加核冲突风险。特朗普政府为了备战有限核战争，提出在潜射弹道导弹和海基巡航导弹上部署低当量弹头W76-2。民主党曾在2020年竞选纲领中称W76-2低当量弹头毫无必要，但美国新版《核态势审议报告》仍支持生产该款弹头，并继续在潜射弹道导弹上安装该款弹头。

The US is practicing double standards in proliferating weapon-grade fission materials. The US and the UK plan to transfer to Australia under the AUKUS framework nuclear submarines that carry enough highly enriched uranium to make 60-80 nuclear warheads, which essentially constitutes an act of nuclear proliferation. The three countries have also been stalling a report to relevant agencies on the substantive progress of their nuclear submarine cooperation on the grounds that they haven’t determined the cooperation plan yet.

劣迹六：奉行双重标准，扩散武器级裂变材料。美国和英国打算在AUKUS框架下向澳大利亚转让核潜艇，其载有的高浓铀数量可能足以制造60—80枚核弹头。这在实质上构成了核扩散行为。美英澳还始终以“未确定合作方案”为由，拒不向相关机构报告核潜艇合作实质进展。

America’s development of nuclear forces based on a narrow perspective of major-country competition while hyping up the imagination-fueled “China nuclear threat” is in no way good for the stable development of China-US relations, particularly nuclear relations.

美国基于大国竞争狭隘视角，大力发展自身核力量，同时以臆想为依据炒作所谓“中国核威胁”，不利于中美关系发展及核关系稳定。

(The author is Director of the Center for Arms Control Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations)

（作者为中国现代国际关系研究院军控研究中心主任）

Editor's note: Originally published on china.com.cn, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.