The US Department of Defense released in a package its National Defense Strategy (NDS), Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR) on October 27, 2022, to further elaborate on the incumbent administration’s security outlook after issuing the National Security Strategy on October 12.
Among them, the NPR gave a pretty comprehensive review of the main nuclear security challenges faced by the country now and its countermeasures in store, coming to the strategic judgment that China is a pacing threat to the US. The document has inherited both Trump’s “major-country competition” theory and Obama’s arms control vision of a “nuclear-free world”, which is just one example of its logical paradoxes. There are three questions the document doesn’t answer, at least not clearly.
2022年10月27日，美国防部“打包”发布《国防战略》《核态势评估》和《导弹防御评估》三个报告，在10月12日《国家安全战略》报告的基础上对本届政府的安全观进一步予以细化阐释。其中，《核态势评估》报告（以下简称《报告》）全面概述了美当前面临的主要核安全挑战及后续应对的思路举措，特别给出“中国对美步步紧逼威胁”的战略判断。《报告》既有特朗普政府大国竞争的基本论调，也包含了奥巴马政府“无核世界”的军控理念。也正因如此，文本中不乏逻辑相互矛盾之处，其中有三个问题未给予明确回应。
How to realize the ideal of nuclear arms control in the context of major country competition?
如何在大国竞争背景下实现“降核理想”？
Biden during his election campaign vowed to reduce the use of nuclear weapons, and has reiterated his stance to lower the strategic position of nuclear weapons in several documents since he came into office.
拜登在竞选期间就曾表态要“展示对减少核武器作用的承诺”，上台至今更是在多份文件中声明，要降低核武器的战略地位。
So far, however, what the Biden administration has done falls long behind what it promised. Despite all the trumpeting of nuclear arms control, it has continued to see nuclear weapons as an important strategic means to serve its major country competition, even likely to rely more on it.
不过，仅就目前来看，拜登政府在“降核”方面仍然言不符实，虽在表述层面高呼“降核”，但在行动层面却是继续将核武器作为重要战略手段服务大国竞争，甚至更有加大对核武器倚重之势。
For one thing, the US has officially affirmed China and Russia as major nuclear states and set the goal of developing the capacity to deter both countries simultaneously. For another, it has sped up the modernization of its nuclear arsenal. A request for US$34.4 billion for FY2023 has been submitted to modernize the “triad” deterrence system alone, much more than the US$27.7 billion in FY2022. Thirdly, it is working to fill up the “deterrence tool kit”. In addition to traditional nuclear forces, the US has paid more attention to non-nuclear domains such as hypersonic, space and cyber technologies, trying to foster low-cost, high-yield “integrated deterrence”.
其一，其已正式确认“中俄同为核大国”，明确表示要具备同时威慑中俄的“硬性指标”；其二，加速核武器现代化进程，仅就“三位一体”现代化来说，2023财年申请费用344亿美元，远高于2022财年的277亿美元；其三，要求进一步丰富“威慑工具箱”，除传统核力量外，将关注重点转向高超声速、太空与网络技术等非核领域，力求打造成本低、效益高的“一体化威慑”。
How to maintain “strategic stability” in the context of major country competition?
如何在大国竞争背景下维护“战略稳定”？
Strategic stability usually includes stability in arms race and stability in crisis. The latest NPR, on the surface, expressed the wish to maintain strategic stability, but that’s just about how far the idea can go as long as the strategic focus stays on major country competition. A close look at what the current administration has done in the past two years would show that it has been weakening rather than strengthening strategic stability.
战略稳定通常包含军备竞赛稳定和危机稳定。新版《报告》从这两方面入手，在文本层面表露了美维护战略稳定的主观意愿，不过，只要美“大国竞争”的战略重心不变，其维护战略稳定的想法就只能是流于表面。结合本届政府两年执政的实际，可看出其一直是在削弱战略稳定，而非增强。
On the one hand, it develops non-nuclear, intermediate-range missile and anti-missile capabilities in a borderline move to establish both offensive and defensive deterrence, which may easily create a security dilemma and destroy the stability of arms race. On the other hand, it plans to “customize” deterrence against China and Russia using tactical nuclear weapons like W76-2,B61-12and dual-purpose warplanes, which not only lowers the threshold of using nuclear weapons, but also – considering the blurring line between nuclear and conventional weapons – easily leads to misjudgment in a crisis and consequently jeopardizes the stability in crisis.
一方面，注重非核、中导、反导能力开发，以“擦边球”方式打造“攻防俱佳”的威慑能力，此举易制造安全困境，破坏军备竞赛稳定；另一方面，给出使用W76-2、B61-12、两用战机等战术核武器对中俄进行“定制威慑”的具体方案，此举不仅降低了核门槛，且考虑到“核常纠缠”因素，极易使危机情形下互动的双方产生误判，破坏危机稳定。
How to balance “extended deterrence” with “nuclear non-proliferation” in the context of major country competition?
如何在大国竞争背景下兼顾“延伸威慑”与“防核扩散”？
The Biden administration attaches great importance to its global alliance and is going all out to weave a resilient system with the US in the center, Indo-Pacific and Europe as two wings, and involving several multilateral regimes including the AUKUS, QUAD, and G7. In the Indo-Pacific direction, the US is building AUKUS in the south and trying “nuclear sharing” in the north by transferring nuclear technology and materials to Australia on the one hand and adding Japan and ROK’s weight in its deterrence system on the other.
In the European direction, the US has consistently armed NATO with nuclear weapons, promoted “nuclear sharing” to more members leveraging the Ukraine crisis, and furthered the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in hopes of standardizing forward deterrence with the more widely applicable F-35. America’s exercise of “double standards” in extending deterrence has grossly undermined the nuclear non-proliferation mechanism and spurred non-nuclear states to own nuclear weapons.
拜登政府极为重视全球盟友体系，正全力打造一个以美为主轴，以“印太、欧洲”两翼盟友为支撑，涵盖美英澳“三边安全伙伴关系”（AUKUS）、美日印澳“四方安全对话”（QUAD）、七国集团（G7）等多边机制在内，相互交织的弹性联盟体系。从印太方向看，美正在南翼全力打造AUKUS、在北翼尝试复制“核共享”，一边向澳转移核技术与核材料，一边又想方设法加强日韩在威慑体系中的权重；从欧洲方向看，美持续强化对北约“核武装”，借乌克兰危机向更多成员国推广“核共享”模式，同时还进一步加强战术核武器的部署力度，希望凭借通用性更高的F-35，实现标准化前沿威慑。可以说，美持“双标”推广“延伸威慑”之举，严重破坏了核不扩散机制的存续，极大增强了无核国家的拥核倾向。
To sum it up, Biden administration’s nuclear policy is torn with “too many ideas”. While Washington hopes to rebuild its leading position in global nuclear arms control and dominate the international order in that area, it is reluctant to let go of the key role played by nuclear weapons in major country competition. It’s imaginably very difficult to come up with a smooth and self-consistent solution in a 30-page-short report.
概言之，拜登政府的核政策“想法太多”。本质上看，其一方面寄希望于重塑美全球核军控领导地位，主导国际军控秩序，另一方面却又不甘舍弃核武器在大国竞争中的关键作用，因而，想要在短短30页的《报告》中给出一份“不纠结、能自洽”的解决方案，必定十分困难。
(The author is associate researcher at the Institute of War Studies of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences. This article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.)
（作者为军事科学院战争研究院助理研究员）
